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INTRODUCTION

More than fifty years ago, in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v.
Commissioner, 1 the Supreme Court upheld the right of federal courts
of appeals to conduct en bane rehearings of prior three-judge appellate

• J.D. 1988, Harvard Law School; Associate, Sullivan & Cromwell. I am indebted to Richard K. Milin for his invaluable assistance. This article is dedicated to the Honorable Samuel A.
Alito, Jr. The views expressed herein are my own.
1. 314 u.s. 326 (1941).
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panel decisions. 2 Subsequently, Congress codified the en bane procedure in section 46(c) of the Judicial Code of 1948.3
Almost from the inception of en bane review, commentators have
criticized its use by the federal courts of appeals. Most commonly, critics have balanced the benefit of the uniformity of intra-circuit law
achieved by en bane review against such perceived disadvantages as
judicial inefficiency,4 diminished finality of three-judge panel decisions 5
and impairment of collegiality within a circuit. 6 The critics have concluded that the federal appellate judiciary would be served best by severely limiting the number of en bane rehearings. They argue that the
number of rehearings could be limited by strictly adhering to circuit
precedent, circulating proposed three-judge panel opinions among all
2. The term "en bane" is derived from the law french for "[i]n the bench" and refers to full
court disposition of an appeal. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 472 (6th ed. 1990). Both Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 35 and the enabling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), use the term "in bane"
rather than "en bane." See FED. R. APP. P. 35; 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988). See also Jon 0. Newman, Foreword: In Bane Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50 BROOK. L.
REv. 365, 365 n.1 (1984) (offering a possible etymology of the anglicized term "in bane"). Being
likewise "doubtful (dubitante)," of any progress (or value) in the direction of anglicizing legal
terminology, the term "en bane" will appear as the nomenclature for rehearing throughout this
article due to "its prevalence in the case law and literature." Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and
En Bane Review, 61 N.C. L. REv. 29, 29 n.l (1988).
Technically, an en bane "hearing" refers to full court consideration by a circuit in lieu of
determination by a three-judge panel, while a "rehearing" refers to en bane review of a case by all
the active judges of a circuit after it has already been presented to a three-judge panel, regardless
of whether a decision has been announced. See Note, En Bane Review in Federal Circuit Courts:
A Reassessment, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1637, 1638 n.S (1974) (citing Lansdale v. Tyler Junior .College, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972) (hearing en bane)). Although the terms "rehearing" and "review" are interchanged in text, this article limits itself to rehearings.
When an appellate court grants en bane review, the prior three-judge panel decision is vacated. See, e.g., 1ST CIR. INTER. OPER. P. X(D) ("Usually when an en bane rehearing is granted
the previous opinion and the judgment will be vacated."); 4TH CIR. INTER. OPER. P. 40.6 ("If a
petition for rehearing is granted, the original judgment and opinion of the Court are vacated and
the case will be reheard before the original panel."); 6TH CIR. INTER. OPER. P. 20.10 ("The effect
of granting a petition for rehearing en bane is to vacate the previous opinion and judgment.");
1OTH CIR. R. 35.6 ("Unless specifically otherwise ordered, the effect of granting a rehearing en
bane is to vacate the panel decision and judgment.").
This article addresses only federal en bane appellate procedures, even though en bane review
may also occur at the state appellate court level. See, e.g., David W. Louisell & Ronan E.
Degnan, Rehearing in American Appellate Courts, 44 CAL. L. REv. 627 (1956) (broadly discussing state appellate court en bane procedures).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988). A full history of the enabling statute is set forth infra text
accompanying notes 10-57.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 120-59.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 160-74.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 175-94.
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the judges , of a circuit prior to publication, and requiring a
supermajority vote to authorize en bane review. 7
Within the last few years, however, a new group of commentators
has criticized en bane review based on quite different concerns. These
commentators have suggested that the rehearing process, if not blatantly political, is at least tacitly so. They have asserted that one of the
main motivations-if not the main motivation-for many recent decisions by courts of appeals having conservative majorities to grant en
bane review is their desire to overturn the decisions of panels composed
of more liberal colleagues in order to conform them to a more conservative ideology. 8 Typically, these critics have also advocated reducing the number of cases granted rehearing.
Contrary to these criticisms, and notwithstanding any ideological
consequences, this article advocates increasing the use of en bane review in order to ensure greater uniformity of circuit law. It also demonstrates that the benefit of intra-circuit uniformity obtained through rehearing cases more than justifies an increased use of the procedure, and
that critics have greatly overstated the institutional costs of en bane
review. Finally, the article suggests that the use of en bane rehearings
can best be increased by reducing the number of judges necessary to
grant rehearing.
Part II reviews the history of en bane review. Part III first asserts
that the greater uniformity of intra-circuit law attained through en
bane rehearings outweighs the costs involved, and advocates increasing
the use of en bane review. Part III then demonstrates that increasing
the use of en bane procedure, and hence majority control of circuit law,
properly helps prevent minority decisions from binding a court's majority to follow decisions with which they disagree, and also conserves judicial resources by reducing the flow of cases to the Supreme Court.
Part IV begins by examining the criticisms of en bane review put
forward by those commentators who have emphasized the institutional
costs of full court rehearings, and concludes that although en bane review may not dispose of cases as expeditiously as three-judge panels,
the threat that en bane rehearings pose to efficiency, finality, collegiality and judicial integrity is exaggerated. Next, Part IV suggests that
use of en bane rehearings may be increased either by ensuring that all
circuits in the federal judiciary interpret the number of judges neces7. See infra text accompanying notes 256-68.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 195-225.
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sary to grant rehearing as a majority of the active available circuit
judges, instead of a majority of the active eligible judges or, more radically, by amending the governing statute-and federal procedural rule to
allow en bane rehearings even when en bane review is desired by less
than a majority of the judges in regular active service. Part IV then
argues that continuing vacancies on the courts of appeals mandate reducing the number of judges necessary to grant en bane rehearings because these vacancies have created a de facto supermajority requirement of judges to authorize en bane review. Finally, Part IV evaluates
the proposals that the critics of en bane review have advanced to improve the procedure by reducing its use and concludes that these proposals will not improve en bane review.
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EN BANC REVIEW 9

The Judiciary Act of 1789 established three separate tiers of federal courts: the Supreme Court, the district courts and the circuit
courts-each of which was composed of two Supreme Court justices
and one district court judge sitting together. 10 In 1802, each Supreme
Court justice was specifically assigned to a circuit and, when presiding,
was referred to as a "circuit justice."11 The circuit court could be held
jointly by the circuit justice of the circuit and the district judge of the
district in which the circuit court was located, or individually by either
the circuit justice or the district court judge. 12 When sitting as circuit
court judges, district court judges were not allowed to hear appeals
from their own cases. 13
As the workload of the Supreme Court grew, the burden of sitting
as circuit justices became too great for the Supreme Court justices and,
in 1869, one circuit court judge was appointed to each of the nine ex9. The description of the historical development of en bane review is derived in large part
from the discussions set forth in Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.
1940) (en bane), affd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). See also Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac.
R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250-53 (1953); Neil D. McFeeley, En Bane Proceedings in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 24 IDAHO L. REv. 255, 255-61 (1987); A. Lamar Alexander, Jr., Note,
En Bane Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (Part 1), 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 563, 567-74 (1965) [hereinafter Alexander, Part I]; Peter
Michael Madden, Comment, In Bane Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 402-03 (1974); Richard J. Fay, Note, En Bane Proceedings in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 482, 482-84 (1954).
10. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
11. See Textile Mills 1, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
12. ld.
13. !d.
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isting circuits. 14 These circuit judges "soon became primarily responsible for holding the circuit courts, relieving the circuit justices of this
work." 111
The Evarts Act of 189P6 created a "circuit court of appeals" in
each circuit consisting of three judges, two of whom constituted a quorum.17 The Evarts Act also directed the President to appoint an additional circuit judge in each circuit. 18 Thus, with the exception of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to which there
previously had been appointed one additional circuit judge/9 two circuit judges were appointed within each circuit. The Evarts Act further
provided that, with the exception of judges who already had been appointed permanently to the courts of appeals, the three judges who constituted each circuit court were to be drawn from the existing three
categories of judges: the circuit justices, the circuit judges and the district judges within the circuit. 20
The Judicial Code of 191221 abolished the three-judge circuit
court system established by the Evarts Act, "thus depriving the circuit
judges of the courts for which they had been primarily responsible
since 1869."22 The enactment of the Judicial Code of 1912 thus left
questions unresolved "as to whether the circuit judges had become ex
officio judges of the circuit court of appeals, and as to whether the
circuit court of appeals in those circuits having more than three circuit
14. The legislation provided in pertinent part: "(t]hat for each of the nine existing judicial
circuits there shall be appointed a circuit judge, who shall reside in his circuit, and shall possess
the same power and jurisdiction therein as the justice of the Supreme Court allotted to the circuit." Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-48
(1968 & Supp. 1992)).
15. See Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 1940) (en
bane), a.ffd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
16. Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-48 (1968
& Supp. 1992)).
17. Id. at§ 2.
18. Id. at § 1.
19. See Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 347, 24 Stat. 492 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-48
(1968 & Supp. 1992)).
20. The statute provided that if either the Supreme Court Justices or the circuit court
judges could not attend a sitting, "one or more district judges within the circuit shall be competent to sit in the court". Evarts Act at § 3.
21. Ch. 231, § 116,36 Stat. 1132 (1911) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-48 (1968 &
Supp. 1992)). The statute became effective January 1, 1912.
22. Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 1940) (en bane),
a.ffd, 314 U.S. 326 {1941).
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judges consisted of all the circuit judges or only three of them, and if
the latter, which three." 23
A subsequent amendment to the Judicial Code of 191224 only partially responded to these questions. Although the amendment expressly
declared that "[t]he circuit judges in each circuit shall be judges of the
circuit court of appeals in that circuit," it ambiguously provided that
"it shall be the duty of each circuit judge in each circuit to sit as one of
the judges of the circuit court of appeals in that circuit from time to
time according to law."25 Hence, although the amendment clarified
that the circuit judges were now assigned to the courts of appeals, the
issue of how many circuit judges constituted any particular court of
appeals-and at what point in time-remained unsettled. As noted
during the Senate's consideration of the amendment, the revision
"makes no change whatever in the existing law except to make it clear
that the circuit judges in the various circuits of the United States shall
constitute the circuit court of appeals." 26 This question would remain
unresolved for twenty-nine years until the Supreme Court was called
upon to mediate an inter-circuit conflict between the Ninth and Third
Circuits on whether a court of more than three members could sit together en bane.
In Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, 27 a three-judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit "was faced with the situation where the decision of two
judges of the circuit"28 in Bank of America v. Commissioner 9 created
a precedent with which "[t]he three judges sitting in [Lang's Estate]
did not agree. " 30 Instead of convening the full court to overrule the
Bank of America decision, however, the three-judge panel in Lang's
Estate presented a certificate to the Supreme Court "disclosing the
23. Id.
24. Act of January 13, 1912, ch. 9, 37 Stat. 52 (1912). The amendment was passed only 12
days after enactment of the original Judicial Code.
25. Id. at 53.
· 26. 47 CONG. REC. 2736 (1912) (remarks of Sen. Sutherland). This conclusion was echoed
by the Committee on the Judiciary to the House of Representatives. See H.R. 199, 62d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1911) (noting that the bill did no more than make "it clear that the circuit judges shall
constitute the circuit court of appeals.").
27. 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938).
28. Id. at 869.
29. 90 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1937). Judge Curtis D. Wilbur dissented from the opinion. Id. at
983.
'
30. Lang's Estate, 97 F.2d at 869. At the time of these decisions, the Ninth Circuit was
composed of seven circuit court judges. There was no overlap in the judges assigned to the two
cases, hence the majority opinion of the two judges in Bank of America "made a precedent for the
remaining five." Id.
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conflict between the two groups of judges and asking that it be resolved
by that tribunal."31 The panel explained that it chose to certify the
question rather than independently act upon it due to its belief that
because "no more than three judges may sit in the Circuit Court of
Appeals, there is no method of hearing or rehearing by a larger
number." 32
By contrast, in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner
("Textile Mills F'), 33 the Third Circuit was faced with a potential ruling by two judges of a three-judge panel with which the remaining two
judges of the five member circuit, and the dissenting judge on the original panel, disagreed. 34 In response, the full court of appeals held that it
"has the power under existing statutes to sit en banc." 35 The majority
justified the use of its power to exercise en bane review as a means of
ensuring intra-circuit uniformity by explaining that "[a] court, as distinguished from the quorum of its members whom it may authorize to
act in its name, cannot consist of less than the whole number of its
members." 38 The court explained that such a holding would serve only
to "destroy the authority of the court as a court and to open the way to
possible confusion and conflict among its personnel and in its procedure
and decisions." 37 The "possible confusion" about which the court expressed concern was that arising from situations "where two of the
three judges sitting in a case may have a view contrary to that of the
other three judges of the court."38 Then, the court reasoned, "it is advisable that the whole court have the opportunity, if it thinks it necessary, to hear and decide the question." 39
The following year, in Oughton v. National Labor Relations
Board," 0 the Third Circuit was once more faced with a potential ruling
by two judges of a three-judge panel with which a dissenting panel
member and the remaining two judges of the circuit disagreed. The
31. Id. at 870.
32. Id. at 869.
33. 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940), a.fl'd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
34. Id. at 71.
35. Id. In so ruling, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was also upholding its own
internal operating rule that "[t]hree judges shall sit in the court to hear all matters, except those
which the court by special order directs to be heard by the court en bane." 3o CIR. INTER. OPER.
R. 4 (March 1, 1940), quoted in Textile Mills Sec. Corp. I, 117 F.2d at 67 n.4.
36. Id. at 70.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 71.
39. Id.
40. 118 F.2d 486 (3d Cir. 1941) (en bane).
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court expressed concerns similar to those which had motivated it to
grant rehearing in Textile Mills I, stating that:
[T]he present is but another instance of the justification for the rule. Its use
removes any possibility that the majority opinion of the court, when composed as
ordinarily of three judges, may conflict with the majority opinion of the court
when composed of one of the same judges and the two remaining judges of the
court. The majority opinion of all will be binding upon all regardless of the views
of individual judges.41

Faced with an irreconcilable inter-circuit conflict, the Supreme
Court in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner ("Textile
Mills IF'), 42 granted the petition for certiorari in Textile Mills I "because of the public importance" of the en bane issue and because of the
growing "contrariety of the views" between the Third and Ninth Circuits.43 In Textile Mills II, the Court upheld the Third Circuit's interpretation of the Evarts Act, ruling that the en bane rehearing procedure "makes for more effective judicial administration [because]
conflicts within a circuit will be avoided [and] finality of decision in the
circuit courts of appeal will be promoted."'' The Court also stated that
the benefits of uniformity and finality achieved by en bane review "are
especially important in view of the fact that in our federal judicial sys41. Id. at 494-95. The Third Circuit's concern for intra-circuit uniformity of its decisions
was described by Judge Albert Maris in a 1953 article as follows:
The principal utility of determinations by the courts of appeals in bane is to enable the
court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it possible for a majority of its
judges always to control and thereby to secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions,
while enabling the court at the same time to follow the efficient and time-saving procedure
of having panels of three judges hear and decide the vast majority of cases as to which no
division exists within the court. Without the procedure in bane it would be possible for
different panels of the court to reach and apply in individual cases diametrically opposite
conclusions upon important questions of law or practice. Not only would this confuse the
law but it might also result in serious strains in the court when subsequently a panel of
judges who individually disagreed with one of these decisions was called upon to decide the
same question in a later case.
Albert Maris, Hearing and Rehearing Cases In Bane, 14 F.R.D. 91, 96 (1953).
42. 314 u.s. 326 (1941).
43. Id. at 327. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or disposition of the case.
44. I d. at 334-35. In addition, the Court held that any "ambiguity in the statute" regarding
how many judges constituted a circuit court "is doubtless the product of inadvertence." I d. at 333.
The Court further explained that "[although] the problem of construction is beset with difficulties,
the conclusion that § 117 provides merely the permissible complement of judges for a circuit
court of appeals results in greater harmony in the statutory scheme than if the language of § 117
is taken too literally." Id. at 333-34.
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tern these courts are the courts of last resort in the run of ordinary
cases."·"~

Seven years later, the Court's decision in Textile Mills II was
codified" 6 into section 46(c) of the Judicial Code of 1948,47 which authorized en bane review whenever ordered by the majority of a circuit's
judges in regular active service.48 During the hearings on the House
45. 314 U.S. at 335.
46. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953)
(declaring that the statutory authorization "is but a legislative ratification or• Textile Mills II);
Fay, supra note 9, at 483 ("The Court's sanction of en bane action [in Textile Mills II] was
incorporated into Title 28 . . . with the express purpose of both recognizing the power to sit en
bane and at the same time continuing the tradition of the three-judge appellate court."). Earlier
efforts to amend the statute had been unsuccessful. See Textile Mills II, 314 U.S. at 334 n.l4
("Beginning in 1938 the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges recommended an amendment to the [then operative Judicial] Code which would enable a majority of the circuit judges in
circuits where there were more than three to provide for a court of more than three judges.")
(citing ATT'Y GEN. REP. 23 (1938)); ATT'Y GEN. REP. 15-16 (1939); REP. OF THE JuDICIAL CoNFERENCE OF SENIOR CIR. JUDGES 7 (1940). The proposed amendment provided that:
in a circuit where there are more than three judges, the majority of the circuit judges may
provide for a court of all the active and available circuit judges of the circuit to sit in bane
for the hearing of particular cases, when in their opinion such action is advisable.
Textile Mills II, 314 U.S. at 334 n.l4. This bill passed the House. H.R. 3390, S. 1053, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), quoted in Western Pac. R.R. Corp., 345 U.S. 247 at 251.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988). In whole, § 46(c) provides that:
Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or panel of not more
than three judges (except that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
may sit in panels of more than three judges if its rules so provide), unless a hearing or
rehearing before the court in bane is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the
circuit who are in regular active service. A court in bane shall consist of all circuit judges
in regular active service, or such number of judges as may be prescribed in accordance with
[the applicable statute] except that any senior circuit judge of the circuit shall be eligible
to participate, at his election and upon designation and assignment pursuant to [the applicable statute] and the rules of the circuit, as a member of an in bane court reviewing a
decision of a panel of which such judge was a member.
The rules governing appellate practice mirror this language. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) ("A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service may order that an appeal or other
proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals in bane."). The federal rules, however, add
the caveat that the granting of en bane review "is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered
except (I) when consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its
decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." Id.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). The number of circuit court judges in active service is provided by
statute. Currently they are authorized by circuit as follows:
D.C.
First
Second
Third

12
6
13
14

Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh

15
17
16
11

Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh

II
28
12
12

28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (Supp. 1992). Because of vacancies, courts often operate at less than their full
constituency. The implications for these vacancies upon the mechanics of granting en bane review
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and Senate bills that eventually became section 46(c), many witnesses
testified that the purpose of amending the Judicial Code to authorize
en bane rehearings was to "obviate the situation where ... a decision
of two judges ... sets the precedent for the remaining judges."49
When enacting section 46(c), Congress "left no doubt as to the
power of the courts to hear cases en banc." 110 It did, however, leave a
critical question unresolved, for Congress made no provision as to how
an en bane procedure might be utilized. 111 Five years later, this question
was addressed by the Supreme Court.
In Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad
112
Co., the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether section 46(c) of
the Judicial Code required courts of appeals to hear cases en bane
whenever suggested by petitioners. 113 The Court held that section 46(c)
did not address litigants, but instead granted power to the courts of
appeals, and left the decision of whether to rehear cases to the appellate courts. 5 4 Although the Court authorized each circuit to "devise its
are discussed infra text accompanying notes 247-55.
49. H.R. REP. No. 1246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. {1941); HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMM. OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY ON S. 1053, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), at 39-40 (state·
ment of H. Chandler, Administrator, Judicial Conference of the United States). See also ADMIN·
ISTRATION OF UNITED STATES COURTS: HEARINGS ON S. 1050-1054, AND H.R. 138 BEFORE THE
SUBCOMM. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 77th Cong., 1st Sess, at 15-16 (1941)
(statement of H. Chandler, Administrator, Judicial Conference of the United States) ("a majority
of the court should not be bound by a decision of two members, particularly if the other members
of the court •.. desire to have their say in regard to what they think the Jaw is." (quoting Judge
John Biggs)); Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 252 (1953)
("This bit of legislative history [i.e., the hearings] is significant. Congress was attempting to frame
legislation which would empower a majority of circuit judges in any Court of Appeals to 'provide'
for hearings en bane.").
50. Fay, supra note 9, at 483-84.
51. See id.
52. 345 u.s. 247 (1953).
53. 345 U.S. at 248. A petition for rehearing refers to a litigant's request for reargument
before the same three-judge panel who heard the appeal. By contrast, a suggestion refers to a
request for a rehearing by the full court. McFeeley, supra note 9, at 261 n.36. See also Newman,
supra note 2, at 367 n.9 ("The somewhat quaint terminology of a 'suggestion' for an in bane
rehearing appears to have originated in colloquy among members of a subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee during hearings on a bill" that was "a predecessor of what became the Act
of June 25, 1948 . . . . When Senator Danaher asked, '[o]n whose motion would the court assemble en bane?,' he was told that counsel might make a 'suggestion.'" (citing HEARINGS ON S. 1053
BEFORE A SUBCOMM. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 49 (statement of Sen.
Danaher)); Western Pac. R.R. Corp., 345 U.S. at 252.
54. /d. at 250. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 35(b) and (c) now provide that:
(b) A party may suggest the appropriateness of a hearing or rehearing in bane. No response shall be filed unless the court shall so order. The clerk shall transmit any such
suggestion to the members of the panel and the judges of the court who are in regular
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own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby a majority may order such a hearing," 1515 the Court also held that "determinations en bane are indicated whenever it seems likely that a majority of
all the active judges would reach a different result than the panel assigned to hear a case or which has heard it." 156 The Court explained
that it had authorized frequent use of en bane rehearings because the
en bane power was too "necessary and useful [a] power·... that we
should ever permit a court to ignore the possibilities of its use in cases
where its use might be appropriate." 157
As the result of the Court's directive in Western Pacific Railroad
Corp. that each circuit determine its own administrative procedures,
the individual courts of appeals have developed their own caselaw, rules
and internal operating procedures to govern en bane proceedings. The
most significant of these rules and procedures are those specifying what
constitutes a "majority" of the court for purposes of tallying en bane
votes. 158 In this respect, the administrative machinery developed in one
circuit may often differ from that employed in another. For example,
the internal operating rule of the United States Court of Appeals for
active service but a vote need not be taken to determine whether the cause shall be heard
or reheard in bane unless a judge in regular active service or a judge who was a member of
the panel that rendered a decision sought to be reheard requests a vote on such a suggestion made by a party.
(c) If a party desires to suggest that an appeal be heard initially in bane, the suggestion
must be made by the date on which the appellee's brief is filed. A suggestion for a rehearing in bane must be made within the time prescribed by Rule 40 for filing a petition for
rehearing, whether the suggestion is made in such petition or otherwise. The pendency of
such a suggestion whether or not included in a petition for rehearing shall not affect the
finality of the judgement of the court of appeals or stay the issuance of the mandate.
FED. R. APP. P. 35(b), (c).
55. Western Pac. R.R. Corp., 345 U.S. at 250. For contemporaneous accounts of the procedures in effect at the time of the Western Pacific Railroad Corp. decision, see Fay, supra note 9,
at 484-88.
56. Western Pac. R.R. Corp., 345 U.S. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
57. Id. at 260.
58. For a detailed description of the different practices within the circuits, see, e.g., Note,
Playing With Numbers: Determining the Majority of Judges Required to Grant En Bane Sittings
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 70 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1523-29 {1984) [hereinafter Note,
Playing with Numbers]; Judah I. Labovitz, Note, En Bane Procedure in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, Ill U. PA. L. REv. 220, 221-27 (1962). See also Thomas J. Waters, Note, The En Bane
Requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 46(c): What Constitutes a Majority in tFte Event of a Refusal or
Disqualification?, ll J. LEGIS. 373 (1984) (discussing the requirements of achieving a "majority"
of circuit court judges for the purposes of ordering full court review); Kathleen Sylvester, What
Does a "Majority" Mean in En Bane Cases?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 16, 1984, at 6. See also infra text
accompanying notes 241-51.
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the Sixth Circuit, which requires an affirmative vote for rehearing by
an "absolute majority"-i.e., a majority of all the active circuit judges
who are eligible to vote-provides that a "majority is determined by
calculating the majority vote of all active judges on the court, not the
number qualified to hear the case." 159 Thus, under an "absolute majority" rule, judges who are either recused or unavailable count as votes
against rehearing during en bane polls. 60 By contrast, the opposite approach has been adopted in the Seventh Circuit. There, the operating
procedure provides that only "[a] simple majority of the voting active
judges is required to grant a rehearing in banc." 61 Under this "simple
majority rule," only an affirmative vote by a majority of those active
judges present is required to grant review. 62 Additionally, some circuit
internal operating procedures and rules altogether avoid defining standards for how many and what type of judges are required to vote in
favor of rehearing in order to reach a majority of the judges in regular
active service, and have inst_ead made this determination through
caselaw. 63
59. See 6TH CIR. INTER. OPER. R. 20.7 (1990).
60. See Copper & Brass Fabricators Council, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 679 F.2d 951
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Curtis-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 599 F.2d 1259 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1022 (1980); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972),
affd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973); 5TH CIR. R. 35.6 (1990) ("For purposes of en bane voting under 28
USC § 46(c), the term 'majority' is defined as a majority of all judges of the court in regular
active service presently appointed to office. Judges in regular active service who are disqualified
for any reason or who cannot participate in the decision of an en bane case nevertheless shall be
counted as judges in regular active service."). Some courts of appeals even construe a non-response as a vote against rehearing. See, e.g., 3D CIR. INTER. OPER. P. 9.5.4 ("An active judge who
does not communicate with the opinionwriting judge concerning rehearing within eight (8) days
after the date of the Clerk's letter transmitting the petition for rehearing is presumed not to desire
in bane or that an answer be filed.").
61. 7TH C!R. OPER. P. 5(d)(l).
62. See, e.g., lOTH CIR. R. 35.5 ("Hearing or rehearing en bane may be ordered by a majority of the judges of this court who are in regular active service and not disqualified in the
particular case or controversy."); 4TH CIR. R. 35(b) ("A majority, but no fewer than four, of all
eligible, active and participating judges may grant a hearing or rehearing in bane."); 2D CiR. R.
35 ("Neither vacancies nor disqualified judges shall be counted in determining the base on which
'a majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service' shall be calculated, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 46(c), for purposes of ordering a hearing or rehearing in bane.").
63. See, e.g., 8TH CIR. INTER. OPER. P. IV D ("A rehearing en bane is granted if a majority
of judges in regular active service vote affirmatively."). Cf. 3D CiR. INTER. OPER. R. 9.5.3 ("Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), only active judges of this court may vote for rehearing in bane.
Therefore, rehearing in bane shall be ordered only upon the affirmative votes of a majority of the
judges of this court in regular active service."); Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910
(3d Cir. 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984) (denying en bane consideration despite affirmative votes by five of the available eight circuit judges when the circuit was comprised
of ten judges). For a detailed account of Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, see generally Neal J.
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TABLE I
En Bane Decisions by Circuit
1982-1991
Circuit

1982 83

84 85 86 87

88 89 90 91

D.C.

5

10

3

5

2

4

13

12

1

7

First

0

0

2

0

1

1

1

5

4

5

Second

1

1

0

1

1

1

2

1

1

0

Third

5

5

3

5

5

8

4

4

2

2

Fourth

8

6

6 18

6 13

19

11

13

9

Fifth

12

11

19 13 18 10

17

5 10

8

Sixth

4

3

9

7

5

7

6

7

6

Seventh

7

8

6

3

7

8

7 10

7 15

Eighth

7

5

15 15

9 11

12 14

7 15

Ninth

9

4

14

6

5

7

9

Tenth

2

3

16

4 12

8

13

Eleventh

10

14

8 19 18 10

16

Totals:

74

66 106 85 90 88

7

4

6

8

17 19 10
7 12

4

117 98 85 89

The data in this, and subsequent tables, are derived from the Annual Reports of the Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which set forth various statistics for
their respective federal fiscal years.

The courts of appeals have also developed their own individual circuit cultures regarding the proper use of en bane rehearings. These circuit cultures "vary according to the size of the circuit, its workload, the
complexity of its en bane cases, the number and perhaps the individual
characteristics of its active judges."8 ' Circuit cultures also affect how
Blaher, Appellate Procedure-Effect of Refusals on Voting for Rehearing In Bane, 30 VILL. L.
REV. 908 (1985).
64. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 576. See also Patricia M. Wald, Calendars, Collegiality, and Other Intangibles on the Courts of Appeals, in THE fEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN
THE 21sT CENTURY 171 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler, eds. 1989) [hereinafter Wald,
Calendars, Collegiality] ("The character of a circuit is a delicate composite of history, judges'
personalities, distinct kinds of regional issues and problems, and even different types of counsel
who appear in court.").
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frequently courts of appeals review cases en bane. For instance, because "[o]ne of the distinctive characteristics of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is the infrequency of rehearings en banc,"65 it has granted the fewest rehearings of any circuit over
the last decade, averaging slig~tly less than one per year.
TABLE II
Average Number of Cases Decided
En Bane Per Circuit
1982-1991
Circuit

Avgfyr

D.C.

6.2

First

1.9

Second

.9

Third

4.3

Fourth

10.9

Fifth

12.3

Sixth

5.8

Seventh

7.8

Eighth

11.0

Ninth

7.5

Tenth

10.4

Eleventh

11.8

Total

7.5

By contrast the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have each averaged
about eleven en bane rehearings per year over the last decade; 66 and
65. Newman, supra note 2, at 365. See also Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Sys., Inc., 194
F.2d 422, 429 (2d Cir. 1951) (per curiam) (Clark, J.) (stating that it is "the practice of this
circuit never to sit in bane."); Note, The Second Circuit: Federal Judicial Administration in a
Microcosm, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 874, 900-08 (1963) (detailing the history of the Second Circuit's
treatment of en bane review).
66. Table II, supra.
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the Fifth Circuit, with an average of more than twelve annual en bane
rehearings, has reheard more cases en bane than any other circuit.67
Ill.
A.

INCREASING THE USE OF EN BANC REVIEW

Greater Uniformity

Beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Mills II,
the process of en bane review has been the subject of extensive legal
scholarship. 68 Advocates of the procedure have lauded its power to encourage uniformity within a circuit's jurisprudence, while detractors
have asserted that the rehearing process diminishes judicial efficiency,
erodes the finality of three-judge panel decisions, decreases collegiality
among the members of a court and raises serious concerns about
whether judges are ideologically result-oriented in reaching their decisions.69 This disagreement over the benefits of en bane rehearings may
result, as one commentator has suggested, from the fact that "no one
model of appellate review can at the same time maximize procedural
values such as finality, economy, consistency, impartiality, and power
concentration." 70
Whatever the origin of the disparity of scholars' opinions regarding the desirability of en bane review, academics who have analyzed
the en bane process typically have engaged in a cost-benefit analysis,
weighing the benefits of the uniformity of intra-circuit law71 achieved
67. Id.
68. The first published treatment of en bane review was a Note in the 1942 Harvard Law
Review that reported the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Mills II. See Note, The Power of a
Circuit Court of Appeals to Sit En Bane, 55 HARV. L. REv. 663 (1942). Two additional Notes
were published the year following the Supreme Court's later decision in Western Pacific Railroad
Corp. See Note, The En Bane Procedures of the United States Courts of Appeals, 21 U. CHI. L:
REv. 447 (1954); Fay, supra note 9.
69. See text accompanying notes 120-225.
70. Solimine, supra note 2, at 41 (citing Judith Resnik, Tiers, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 84559, 874 (1984)).
71. Professor Arthur Hellman, in his study of the jurisprudence and appellate procedures of
the Ninth Circuit, has posited a three-part test for determining the existence of an intra-circuit
conflict. See Arthur Hellman, Breaking the Bane: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 915, 923 and passim (1992) [hereinafter Hellman, Breaking the
Bane]. The first part, which asks whether the holding of a new opinion reaches a different result
from that of an existing circuit precedent, is discussed in the context of Wright v. United States
Parole Comm'n and E.M. Diagnostic v. Local 169, discussed infra text accompanying notes 9299, and underlies the frustration exhibited by judges authoring opinions dissenting from the denial
of the grant of en bane review, such as the dissent authored by the dissenters in Bartlett ex rei.
Neuman v. Bowen, discussed infra text and accompanying notes 187-91. The second part, which
questions whether the new case can be distinguished from the existing precedent and is therefore
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by en bane review against such potential disadvantages as judicial inefficiency, diminished finality of three-judge panel decisions and impairment of collegiality within a circuit. One commentator finds ironic the
use of cost-benefit analysis by the critics of en bane review, noting his
surprise that "the debate over the en bane proceeding has been conducted in largely utilitarian terms" even though the "commentators
criticizing the most recent use of the en bane process for its lack of
efficiency, are often the first to condemn the use of cost-benefit tests or
balancing formulas when interpreting or applying various procedural
requirements. " 72
Regardless of the irony involved, the critics of en bane review have
concluded from their balancing test that the advantage of uniformity
attained by rehearings is outweighed' by the institutional costs incurred,73 and therefore that en bane rehearings should be granted only
in "the rarest circumstances." 74
Specifically, the critics have argued that en bane rehearings may
not be used justifiably to ensure intra-circuit uniformity through majornot "compelling," is discussed in the context of Part IV, infra text accompanying notes 185-92,
which suggests that the determination of whether certain portions of a proposed opinion actually
conflict with an existing precedent is a matter capable of being given much latitude by individual
judges who often temper their jurisprudential rigidity with collegial considerations. The third part
raises the issue of how, as an institutional objective, conformity to precedent balances against the
growth of a circuit's law through what Professor Karl Llewellyn termed "trial [and] correction."
Arthur Hellman, Breaking the Bane, supra, at 923 (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 397 {1960)). This process, which has also been termed "percolation" by Professors Estreicher and Sexton, see note 183 infra, does not conflict with the assertions made in this article because "conformity" is limited here to those situations where, despite
the similarity of the litigants, "it might be possible," as Judge Maris wrote, "for different panels
of the court" to render "diametrically opposite conclusions." Maris, supra note 41. For a more
complete discussion of the percolation theory, see Todd Tiberi, Supreme Court Denials of Certiorari in Conflicts Cases: Percolation or Procrastination?, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 865 (1993). These
circumstances are different from those in which a panel is asked to apply existing precedent to a
new factual scenario.
72. See Solimine, supra note 2, at 40.
73. Proceedings of the Annual Judicial Conference of the Second Judicial Circuit of the
United States, 106 F.R.D. 103, 159 (1984) [hereinafter Second Circuit Conference] (remarks of
Judge Irving R. Kaufman) ("In balancing the benefits and burdens of the in bane proceeding, I
am firmly convinced that its costs are too great and its advantages too few to warrant its
use. . . .").
'
74. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 159 (remarks of Judge Kaufman). See
also Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 600 ("En bane rehearings therefore should be strongly
disapproved."); Note, supra note 2: at 1654 ("It may be more profitable to reserve en bane treatment for those rare conflicts that involve the integrity of the judicial process."); Steven Bennett &
Christine Pembroke, "Mini" In Bane Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 531, 541 (1986) ("Courts and commentators agree that conventional in bane review must be
used sparingly. . . .").
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ity control of circuit law. The critics reach this conclusion by interpreting the language of the federal rule and the enabling statute that a
court should hear cases en bane only when it is necessary "to secure or
maintain uniformity of its decisions" or to address "a question of exceptional importance," 715 as meaning that en bane rehearings "are supposed to be limited to cases resolving intracircuit conflicts between
panel opinions or to cases deciding questions 'of exceptional importance' " 76 and not "to assure that cases are decided in the way the majority of the whole court would have decided them." 77 This assertion
that en bane review should not be used to maintain majority control
within a circuit is unconvincing because the overwhelming importance
of uniformity to circuit law outweighs the institutional costs incurred
by en bane rehearings. 78
Uniformity has been described as "the most basic principle of jurisprudence."79 This is because "[u]niformity promotes the twin goals
of equity and judicial integrity." 80 Uniformity advances these principles
by ensuring that similar litigants receive similar treatment and, by thus
injecting a measure of predictability into the processes of the legal pro75. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c); FED. R. APP. P. 35.
76. Solimine, supra note 2, at 30. See also Note, Playing With Numbers, supra note 58, at
1510 n.32 ("The en bane device . . . exists for the limited set of cases in which circuit law will be
charted or where exceptional circumstances exist."); Labovitz, supra note 58, at 220 ("There is
little doubt that the en bane procedure . . . was developed for the resolution of intracircuit
conflict.").
77. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 162 (remarks of Judge James R. Browning). See also Note, Playing With Numbers, supra note 58, at 1510 n.32 ("The en bane device
was not created to provide an additional opportunity for review . . .").
78. The critics' misunderstanding should not come as a surprise. One commentator has
termed en bane review "(o]ne of the least understood proceedings in the federal judicial system.".
McFeeley, supra note 9, at 255. Institutional policy concerns may also contribute to affirmative
voting in favor of rehearing. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Of Voting Blocs, and Cabbages and
Kings, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 673, 676 (1973) ("as the federal courts are taking over more and more
of the management of the country, many courts of appeals judges are experiencing considerable
discomfiture in being committed to far reaching policies in whose formulation they had no
voice."); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 165 (1921) ("(T]here
remains a percentage [of cases], not large indeed, and yet not so small as to be negligible, where a
decision one way or the other, will count for the future, will advance or retard, sometimes much,
sometimes little, the development of the law. These are the cases where the creative element in the
judicial process finds its opportunity and power.").
79. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982).
80. Ruth B. Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The lntercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1424-25 (1987) (quoting Note, Intercircuit Conflicts and the Enforcement of Extracircuit Judgments, 95 YALE L.J. 1505 (1986)). See also Patricia M. Wald, Changing Course: The Use of
Precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 477, 488 (1986) [hereinafter
Wa1d, Changing Course] ("the integrity of the circuit's law is [of] paramount concern.").
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cess, providing the "consistency and moral stature essential for the
public's confidence in the justice system."81
When viewed in abstract, intra-circuit uniformity does not mandate majority control of a circuit's law. Conceivably, a circuit can
achieve uniformity of law without a majority of its judges controlling
its decisions through strict adherence to existing precedent by all of the
circuit members. In reality, however, judges, whether within the minority or majority of their circuits, will either avoid or conflict with existing precedent when they do not believe previous rulings correctly apply their circuit's law or aptly reflect what the law should be. As Judge
Wald has observed, "[s]ometimes, different lines of precedent based on
quite different premises coexist uneasily for years without actually colliding, and the judges will follow those precedents which they like
best."82 Thus, until either en bane or Supreme Court review of conflicting or minority three-judge panel decisions occurs, a court is left in the
interim with a perplexing disarray of precedent, and each of these rulings might be thought to "reflect[] the majority view of the active
judges."83 The results of such circumstances are decisions that serve
only to "confuse the law" and create serious strains in a circuit when
the panel of judges who individually disagreed with one of these decisions is later called upon to decide the same question. 84 Accordingly,
without majority control of circuit law, judicial integrity is severely
challenged because similar litigants leave the courthouse with divergent
results. Thus, as Judge Maris observed, en bane review of cases "enable[s] the court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it
possible for a majority of its judges always to control . . . its
decisions. " 86
In addition, given the option of revising an opinion en bane, a majority of the judges of a circuit should not be forced to abide by decisions that do not reflect their understanding of the law, because this
raises greater concerns over the integrity of the judicial process. After
all, one reason for having multiple judges on appellate courts is that
81. John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term Result-Oriented to Characterize Appellate
Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187, 202 (1984).
82. Wa1d, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 481. This is an additional reason for the
failure of the critics' proposal to improve en bane review through strict adherence to circuit precedent, as discussed infra text accompanying notes 259-261.
83. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 586.
84. Maris, supra note 41, at 96.
85. /d. This language was later quoted favorably by the Supreme Court. See United States
v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689-90 (1960).
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their "different perceptions, premises, logic, and values
. insures a
86
better judgment." This is so even if the judges may have similar jurisprudential ideologies. The diversity of their backgrounds and personalities add to the general formula. Majority control of a circuit's decisions
is therefore necessary both to achieve intra-circuit uniformity and to
protect the integrity of the judicial process.

B. Avoiding Minority Control
Although an increase in en bane review will immediately create a
more conservative jurisprudence reflecting the current majority of federal circuit judges, it should not be sacrificed because a temporary ideological change will result. 87 Increasing the use of en bane rehearings
will enable circuits to achieve greater intra-circuit uniformity of law,
avoiding minority control of circuit law, and preventing the confusion
generated by conflicting lines of precedent. In addition, fewer cases will
flow to the Supreme Court.
It is well-settled that for the purposes of circuit precedent, every
decision by a three-judge panel binds the entire circuit and only a court
en bane, not another three-judge panel, can reverse the holding of a
three-judge panel decision.88 Without en bane rehearings, a mere twojudge minority can prevent the "policy that the active circuit judges
shall determine to be the major doctrinal trends of the future for their
court" 89 and may use "majority status on a panel to commit the court
86. FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE, REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 174 (1980).
87. The extent to which the jurisprudence of any individual circuit can shift because of a
changed constituency of the majority that controls circuit precedent is dependent on the number
of vacant judgeships, see Table VII, infra, as well as the characteristics of individual judges (for
example, how strictly they adhere to circuit precedent). Despite temporary-even
strong-ideological shifts, majority control is the preferable means by which to achieve uniformity
within a circuit. It is, moreover, quite natural for circuit law to develop through "swings" in
ideology. See text supra accompanying notes 221-2S.
88. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Meba Pension Trust, 9S6 F.2d 468, 471 n.3 (4th Cir. 1992)
("under this circuit's long-standing, formal practice" a prior three-judge panel decision "is considered binding upon all panels of this court until overruled by an en bane decision of this court or a
decision of the Supreme Court"); Dawidoff v. Minneapolis Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, SSO
F.2d 407, 411 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977). Several courts of appeals have set forth this principle in their
internal rules. See, e.g., 3D CIR. INTER. 0PER. P. 9.1 ("It is the tradition of this court that the
holding of a panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent
panel overrules the holding in a published opinion of a previous panel. Court in bane consideration
is required to do so."). See also Newman, supra note 2, at 370 ("It is now widely agreed that in
bane consideration is normally required to overrule existing precedent in a circuit.").
89. United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 26S F.2d 136, ISS (2d Cir. 19S7)
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to its own view. " 90 Thus, en bane review of cases is necessary in order
to achieve uniformity of intra-circuit law, because only en bane rehearings "permit[] a court of appeals to maintain decisional uniformity." 91
The necessity of en bane review to prevent a majority of a court from
committing its yntire circuit to a holding with which the full court
would disagree may be seen from the dissenting opinions in two cases
originating in different circuits.
In Wright v. United States Parole Commission, 92 the panel majority relied upon a prior decision, Jones v. United States Bureau of Prisons98 that apparently departed radically from circuit precedent and, according to the dissent, abandoned the traditional abuse-of-discretion
standard deployed by the Eighth Circuit to review parole decisions. 94
Judge Heaney's dissent asserted that not only was the Jones panel obligated to follow prior circuit cases but that the panel in Wright was
obligated to follow pre-Jones precedent. 95 To do otherwise not only
would ignore established circuit practice that "our traditional standard
can only be overturned by the court en bane," but also would create
confusing and conflicting lines of precedent. 96 Accordingly, Judge Heaney urged that the decision "be referred to the court en bane to decide
(Clark, C.J. and Waterman, J., separate statement), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
363 U.S. 685 (1960). See also Madden, supra note 9, at 409 (en bane rehearings allow "all the
active judges in the circuit [to] establish a rule of the majority for the circuit."). /d. at 402
("Some method is needed for the majority of active judges to maintain control over the panels.
Use of the en bane procedure can accomplish this.").
90. Fay, supra note 9, at 491. See also Friendly, supra note 78, at 675 ("a policy by which
two judges are empowered to commit a [larger] court to a decision which is contrary to the views
of the other [appellate] judges and then to prevent that dissenting majority from ordering a determination of the case en bane, violates both the spirit and the letter of the statute and frustrates
the salutary purpose of the en bane procedure."); McFeeley, supra note 9, at 263 ("Without en
bane review, a majority of the circuit judges might be unable to have 'their say.' ").
91. Note, Playing With Numbers, supra note 58, at 1508. See also Bennett & Pembroke,
supra note 74, at 536 (the "structure and function of federal appellate courts mandate an en bane
review process.''); Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat
to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 583-84 (1969) ("en
bane procedure is essential to a healthy law of the circuit.''); McFeeley, supra note 9, at 274 ("En
bane consideration is essential to maintain the integrity of each circuit's decisions."); A. Lamar
Alexander, Jr., Note, En Bane Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (Part II}, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 726, 744 (1965) [hereinafter Alexander,
Part II] ("There is no workable alternative to consideration by all the active judges of the circuit
en bane.'').
92. 948 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1772 (1992).
93. 903 F.2d 1178 (8th Cir. 1990).
94. Wright, 948 F.2d at 436 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (citing Johnson v. Moral, 843 F.2d 846, 847 (5th Cir. 1988)).
96. /d.
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whether we should depart from our traditional abuse-of-discretion standard when we review parole decisions." 97
Similarly, in E.M. Diagnostic v. Local 169,98 a case involving collective bargaining agreements, Judge Garth dissented from a majority
holding he believed was unsupported by authority stating:
The majority's decision in this case must inevitably lead to the confusion of the
labor bar, unions, management, and the district court judges. Rather than fostering the goals of predictability and precedential integrity in the interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements, I fear that this decision by the majority will do
just the opposite. It is for that reason that I not only respectfully dissent, but I
urge consideration by the court in banc.89

Along with early en bane review cases, the contemporary writings
of one of the judges who codified the en bane procedure and co-wrote
the subsequent legislative history of section 46(c), all help demonstrate
that the "maintenance of uniformity in circuit decisions was the dominant purpose underlying the creation of the en bane procedure." 100
Judge Maris who, in addition to being an influential and respected
judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,101
was also the Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on the
Revision of the Judicial Code102 and one of the main forces behind the
97. Id. at 438.
98. 812 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1987).
99. Id. at 104 (Garth, J., dissenting).
100. Note, The Politics of En Bane Review, 102 HARV. L. REV. 864, 875 (1989). See also
Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S, 247, 271 {1953) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("the dominant ends of [en bane review are] avoiding or resolving intra-circuit conflicts . . . ."); Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 74: at 536 ("The legislative history of the in bane
rules and the thrust of the relevant Supreme Court cases indicate that the in bane procedure was
originally designed to minimize conflicts in precedent."); McFeeley, supra note 9, at 261 ("The
major reason for the existence of en bane rehearings is to ensure intra-circuit consistency. . . .");
Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 162 (remarks of Judge Browning) ("The en bane
process ... helps achieve ... predictability."); Madden, supra note 9, at 408 ("the underlying
purpose of the in bane procedure [is] the maintenance of control over the decisions within the
circuit."). Cf. Daniel Egger, Court of Appeals Review of Agency Action.' The Problem of En
Bane Ties, 100 YALE L.J. 471, 477 (1990) ("The en bane jurisdiction of the United States Courts
of Appeals was not created deliberately as part of a coherent theory of Article III jurisprudence;
its existence owes more to historical accident.").
101. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 253 (1953)
(noting Judge Maris's position of prominence); In Memory of Hon. Albert Branson Maris (18931989) United States Circuit Judge (remarks of Judge John P, Fullam), 894 F.2d at CIII (Judge
Maris "was a role model for every judge on our Court . . . . [h]e was the ideal of what a judge
should be.").
102. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 253-54 (1953)
("At that time, Judge Maris, Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Revision of
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creation of section 46(c). 103 Judge Maris set forth his views in a 1953
article entitled Hearing and Rehearing Cases In Banc: 10"' "The principal utility of determinations by the courts of appeals in bane is to enable the court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it
possible for a majority of its judges always to control and thereby to
secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions." 105 Judge Maris further explained that by maintaining majority control of circuit law, the
members of a circuit could prevent intra-circuit conflicts that served
only to "confuse the law" and "also result[ed] in serious strains in the
court when subsequently a panel of judges who individually disagreed
with one of these decisions was called upon to decide the same question
in a later case." 106
The legislative history of section 46(c) also amply demonstrates
that Congress intended en bane review to be used to maintain majority
control. The record of the hearings on the House and Senate bills that
eventually became section 46(c), reveals that the purpose of amending
the Judicial Code to add a section specifically providing courts of appeals with statutory authorization to sit en bane was to "obviate the
situation where . . . a decision of two judges . . . sets the precedent for
the remaining judges." 107 The testimony given at the hearings "exthe Judicial Code, submitted a memorandum to the House Committee on Revision of Laws ..."
This proposal was the genesis of the present ·§ 46(c)). In addition, Judge Maris also was the
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and a member of the
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules. See Madden, supra note 9, at 407 n.63.
103. See Revision of Federal Judicial Code, Preliminary Draft of H.R. 3498, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess., Committee Print II (1945) (recognizing in the reviser's Notes to the draft of§ 46(c)
that "[s]uch subsection (c) is based on recommendations of Circuit Judge Albert B. Maris of the
Third Circuit in his memorandum dated August 18, 1944, and submitted to the Committee on
Revision of the Laws on August 21, 1944."); Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co.,
345 U.S. 247, 254 n.9, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 910 (1953). Both the Supreme Court and Congress
took these facts into account when considering the adoption of§ 46(c):
Judge Maris was called upon by Chief Justice Stone to serve as chairman of the Judicial
Conference's Committee of Revision of the Laws of the United States. He served on this
committee from 1944 until 1967 by successive appointments of Chief Justices Vinson and
Warren. That committee collaborated with the Judiciary Committee from the House of
Representatives and its staff, first in the monumental job of revising Title 28 of the United
States Code and thereafter in considering continuing issues related thereto.
In Memory of Hon. Albert Branson Maris (1893-1989) United States Circuit Judge (remarks of
Judge Dolores K. Sloviter), 894 F.2d at C.
104. 14 F.R.D. 91 (1953).
105. I d. at 96. This language was later mentioned by the Supreme Court. See United States
v. American Foreign Steamship Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 688 (1960).
106. 14 F.R.D. at 96.
107. H.R. REP. No. 1246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMM. Of
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY ON S. 1053, supra note 49, at 39-40 (statement of H.
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plain[s that] the underlying purpose of the in bane procedure
[was] the maintenance of control over the decisions within the circuit."108 This legislative history is significant because, as the Supreme
Court later explained in Western Pacific Railroad Corp., "Congress
was attempting to frame legislation which would empower a majority
of circuit judges in any Court of Appeals to 'provide' for bearings en
bane" in order to maintain majority control of circuit law.109
The Eighth and Third Circuit rulings in Wright and E.M. Diagnostic, as well as the earlier decisions in Textile Mills I and Oughton,
along with the contemporaneous writings of Judge Maris and the legislative history of section 46(c), demonstrate the importance of en bane
review as a means of ensuring intra-circuit uniformity through majority
control by preventing minority control of circuit law.

C.

Reducing the Supreme Court's Burden

Increasing the use of en bane review will also assist courts of appeals in their administrative task of reducing the flow of cases to the
Supreme Court. 110 This is because the only alternative to ordering en
bane rehearing of a case that either raises an intra-circuit conflict or
does not reflect the majority of a court's view, is to leave the matter
unresolved in the hope that the Supreme Court will itself decide to
determine the issue. This is an unsatisfactory result as the Supreme
Court cannot, and should not, be required to be the arbiter of intracircuit conflicts.
The Supreme Court cannot be relied upon to determine intra-circuit conflicts because the Court is functionally "no longer capable of
providing the supervision of federal judicial law making that it once
provided."lll Moreover, the Court bas clearly shown a disinclination to
supervise closely the courts of appeals in this regard because it rouChandler, Administrator, Judicial Conference of the United States). See also ADMINISTRATION OF
UNITED STATES COURTS: HEARINGS ON S. 1050-1054, AND H.R. 138 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 49, at 15-16 (statement of H. Chandler, Administrator, Judicial Conference of the United States) ("a majority of the court should not be
bound by a decision of two members, particularly if the other members of the court •.• desire to
have their say in regard to what they think the law is." (quoting Judge Biggs)).
108. Madden, supra note 9, at 408.
109. 345 u.s. 247, 252 (1953).
110. See, e.g., Note, Playing With Numbers, supra note 58, at 1508 ("the en bane procedure ..• serves a crucial function in the administration of federal courts.").
Ill. Carrington, supra note 91, at 553. See also Note, Playing With Numbers, supra note
58, at 1508 ("the Supreme Court has long ceased to perform this function").
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tinely "refuses to accept certification of an intra-circuit conflict on the
grounds that it is the institutional responsibility of a court of appeals to
resolve its own internal conflicts and uniformly develop circuit precedent."112 For example, in Civil Aeronautics Board v. American Air
Transport, Inc., 113 the Court dismissed a certificate from the D.C. Circuit, which had been "unable to agree on a disposition of the case,"
and suggested that "the Court of Appeals . . . hear this case en bane
to resolve the deadlock indicated in the certificate and give full review
to the entire case."114 Additionally, as the Court has noted on numerous occasions, the adjudication of intra-circuit conflict through en bane
review is primarily an appellate court task because the courts of appeals "are the courts of last resort in the run of ordinary cases. " 1115
Surprisingly, despite the Supreme Court's clear mandate that the
courts of appeals resolve their own intra-circuit disputes, two judges of
the Second Circuit have advocated, or at the very least condoned, the
practice of leaving intra-circuit conflicts for the Supreme Court. 116 Fortunately, this view has been rejected by most circuit judges. For example, in Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 117 Judge Rein'
112. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 582.
113. 344 u.s. 4 (1952).
114. Id. at 4-5. See also United States ex rei. Robinson v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 649, 650
(1942) (remanding the case "for further proceedings, including leave to petitioner to apply for a
hearing before the court en bane" where it appeared that a "conflict of views" had arisen "among
the judges of the Ninth Circuit"), cited with approval in Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western
Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 260 n.20 (1953) (observing "that this Court has deemed the en bane
power to be an important and useful device in the administration of justice in the courts of appeals
is apparent from our action in" these cases).
115. Textile Mills II, 314 U.S. 326, 334-35 (1942).
116. See Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 158 (remarks of Judge Kaufman)
("By subordinating personal views to the institutional needs for certainty and finality" and refusing to grant en bane review of cases creating intra-circuit conflict, the "question will finally be
settled where it ought to be settled-at the Supreme Court level."); Newman, supra note 2, at
383 ("In the Second Circuit, we [are] ... mindful that review by higher authority is available"
and have therefore rejected en bane reconsideration). On at least two occasions, the Supreme
Court justified the Second Circuit's confidence and granted certiorari. See, e.g., Green v. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1309, 1310 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 814 (1976)
("This Court has denied en bane . . . not because we believe these cases are insignificant, but
because they are of such extraordinary importance that we are confident the Supreme Court will
accept these matters under its certiorari jurisdiction"); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 479 F.2d
1005, 1020 (2d Cir.) (Kaufman, Feinberg, Mansfield, Mulligan, JJ. & Friendly, C.J. concurring
in the denial of rehearing en bane), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 908 (1973) ("I vote against en bane,
not because I believe this case is unimportant, but because the case is of such extraordinary consequence that I am confident the Supreme Court will take this matter under its certiorari
jurisdiction.").
117. 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Francis
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hardt dissented from the denial of rehearing en bane mainly on his
belief that "our circuit would be better served if we did the necessary
job [of resolving intra-circuit conflicts] ourselves. I think that it is our
function to correct our errors in cases of general importance . . .
through our en bane process." 118 In fact, some circuit judges believe
that even inter-circuit conflicts should be reviewed en banc.119
IV.

A.

CRITICISMS OF EN BANC REVIEW

Inefficiency

Most of the criticisms of en bane rehearings have focused on its
alleged inefficiency. 12° For example, one circuit court judge has averred
that "the en bane proceeding is the most time-consuming and inefficient device in the appellate judiciary's repertoire." 121 The en bane procedure has also been disparaged by terms that run the gamut from
"cumbersome" 122 to "unwieldy,"123 and has even been referred to as a
"damned nuisance." 124
In claiming that en bane rehearings are inefficient, critics have asserted that "federal circuit courts currently labor under very heavy
Ford, Inc., 459 U.S. 999 (1982).
118. I d. at lOll (Reinhardt, J. dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane). See also Madden, supra note 9, at 408 ("The courts of appeals have a duty to develop the federal law with
uniformity."); Maris, supra note 41, at 96 ("The procedure in bane enables the court itself to deal
authoritatively with problems of this nature, thus relieving the burden of the Supreme Court.");
Carrington, supra note 91, at 583 ("the responsibility for maintaining the law of the circuit"
belongs to the circuit judges.).
119. See, e.g., Financial lnst. Employees Local No. 1182 v. NLRB, 750 F.2d 757, 758 (9th
Cir. 1984) (Kennedy, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); Uviedo v. Steves Sash &
Door Co., 760 F.2d 87, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rubin, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
bane), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
120. See, e.g., Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 74, at 532 ("in bane proceedings . . . . are
cumbersome, costly and time-consuming."); Note, supra note 2, at 1644 ("The major drawback of
en bane review is its heavy cost in court and litigant time and expense."); Madden, supra note 9,
at 418 ("The in bane procedure is inherently and unavoidably, time-consuming."); Carrington,
supra note 91, at 582 ("The en bane procedure is . . . time consuming for the judiciary and
burdensome to litigants.").
121. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 155 (remarks of Judge Kaufman).
122. Newman, supra note 2, at 382; Green v. Santa Fe Industries, 533 F.2d 1283, 1310 (2d
Cir. 1976) (per curiam), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
123. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISES AND REFORM 101 (1985).
124. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A
STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 217 (1981). See also Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 152 (remarks of Judge Lawrence W. Pierce) (referring
to en bane consideration as "[n]ettlesome").
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caseloads"1215 without rehearing cases en banc. 126 Because more time is
necessary to conduct full court review of a case than simply to dispose
of it by a three-judge panel, the critics argue that the use of en bane
rehearings "must be strongly disfavored, and justification for them
should approach the level of necessity." 127
Although en bane review of a case may not be as efficient as a
three-judge panel disposition of the same case, the extent and effect of
its "inefficiency" have been greatly exaggerated. It is certainly true
that the workload of the federal courts is heavy and has been increasing at a rapid pace. The Federal Judicial Center reported that in the
thirty year period between 1958 and 1988, the annual number of civil
cases terminated on the merits by the courts of appeals increased
577% from an annual figure of 2,831 to 19,178.128 This increase in the
125. Note, supra note 2, at 1644. See also Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 576 (observing that most federal court circuit judges are functioning at full caseload capacity); Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 155 (remarks of Judge Kaufman) (noting the "the federal
courts' staggering work load"). It is also worth noting the candid remark of one circuit court
judge that. "American judges think of themselves as continuously besieged." Patricia M. Wald,
Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review
and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REv. 887 (1987) [hereinafter Wald, Some Thoughts on
Judging].
126. "Each year, every judge has a heavy schedule of brief-reading, oral arguments, motions work and opinion writing in connection with cases on the regular calendar. It is an enormous
distraction to break into this schedule and tie up the entire court to hear one case en bane."
Bartlett ex rei. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Edwards, J.,
concurring in the denial of rehearings en bane) (emphasis in original). See also Solimine, supra
note 2, at 30 ("As it is, federal judges and their staffs are busy enough reading briefs, hearing oral
arguments, and writing opinions in the panel process. The en bane process requires the judiciary
to engage in another round of written and sometimes oral argument from the litigants.").
127. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 577. See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 476
F.2d 806, 827 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) ("en bane review adds immeasurably
to the expenditure of judicial time, energy and resources on the part of members of this already
overburdened court."); Newman supra note 2, at 382 ("[t]he in bane process ... places a severe
strain on judicial resources already considerably overburdened."); Note, supra note 2, at 1644
("en bane hearings occupy all of the active judges of the circuit with the adjudication of a single
case."). The overall situation has caused one circuit judge to state that "[a]s one keenly aware of
the federal courts' staggering workload and the concomitant need for efficient judicial administration, I am particularly distressed by the increasing popularity of the in bane procedure in several
circuits." Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 155 (remarks of Judge Kaufman). Interestingly, another judge of that same circuit asserts that the heavy workload of the federal courts
has had the opposite effect-that of dissuading rehearings. See Friendly, supra note 78, at 676
("[The] desire for more en banes is being held in check by the tremendous pressure of work due to
the explosion of the business of the courts of appeals.").
128. See THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 64. This
figure reached an all-time high last year when the United States Courts of Appeals reached a
disposition of 39,825 cases. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, 135 (1991). By comparison, the annual number of civil cases commenced in
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federal appellate caseload has had a similar impact on the individual
judges, despite a coinciding expansion in the number of federal circuit
court judges.129 In 1964, Professor Wright's study of Fifth Circuit
judges concluded that circuit judges who disposed of 80 cases per year
were working at capacity. 130 By comparison, in 1989 Judge Edwards of
the D.C. Circuit reported that during an average full court term he
participated in the resolution of between 17 5 and 200 cases. 131 Despite
the voluminous number of cases handled by the circuits, the collective
courts of appeals have granted only an average of 90 full court reviews
each year over the past decade-approximately 8 annual rehearings per
circuit. Viewed in proportion, en bane rehearings account only for
.524% of all cases decided by the courts of appeals during the last
decade, just slightly more than one-half of 1%.132 This figure is materially lower than the .644% of total cases decided en bane during the
previous decade. 133 Moreover, the overall percentage of cases heard en
U.S. District Courts "only" increased 257%, from 67,115 annual cases to 239,634. See id. at 88.
See also Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 385, 387 (1983) [hereinafter Edwards, The Rule of a Judge] (reporting "an enormously expanding caseload, both in the
quantity of cases heard and the mix of substantive issues").
129. The number of circuit judges authorized to sit on the courts of appeals is provided in
28 U.S.C. § 44(a).
130. See Charles A. 'Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEX. L. REV. 949, 956-57 (1964).
131. See Edwards, The Role of a Judge, supra note 129, at 389. But see Marc Galanter,
The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 Mo. L. REv. 3 (1986) (dismissing concerns about the
litigation explosion by comparing gross percentage gains with per capita increases); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 4 (1983).
132. See Table III, supra.
133. See Table IV, infra. Thus, the criticism directed by one author at Professor Solimine
that his study suffers from shortcomings "because it does not incorporate cases decided in 1988"
and hence "fails to include decisions from the circuits that attained Reagan-appointed majorities
[after] 1987" is without merit. See Note, supra note 100, at 866-67. This student's criticisms of
en bane review that "[t]he overall number of cases disposed of en bane reached an all time high"
in 1988 while "rehearings as a percentage of the total caseload also increased relative to" 1986·
1987, are also irrelevant. See id. at 867 n.l3.
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TABLE III
Totals and Percentages of
En Bane Decisions
1982-1991
Year

Total Cases Total En Bane % of Total Caseload Heard
Decisions
En Bane

1982

12,327

74

.600

1983

13,217

66

.499

1984

14,327

106

.739

1985

16,369

85

.519

1986

18,199

90

.494

1987

18,502

88

.476

1988

19,178

117

.610

1989

19,322

98

.507

1990

21,006

85

.405

1991

22,707

89

.392

Ten Year Average

17,515

90

.524

bane by the courts of appeals has been steadily decreasing since
1988,134 reaching a 20 year low in 1991 of .392% of total cases terminated on the merits. 1311 In fact, the current yearly proportion of rehearings to decided cases is only about one-fifth of the 2.5% rate of 40
years ago. 136 Thus, contrary to alarmist critiques, rehearings constitute
an insignificant, as well as a dwindling, share of the workload of federal circuit judges, and do not add a measurable burden to the existing
federal caseload. 137
134. See Table IV, supra.
135. See Table III, supra; Table IV, supra.
136. In 1953, Judge Maris noted that "[t]he total number of cases heard or reheard in bane
during the last annual term of the court was only six out of the total of 239 cases heard." Maris,
supra note 41, at 92.
137. See Solimine, supra note 2, at 42 (noting that an intolerable burden is not created by
these cases, which comprise approximately 0.5% of the caseload).
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TABLE IV
Totals and Percentages of
En Bane Decisions
1972-1981
Year

Total Cases Total En Bane % of Total Caseload Heard
Decisions
En Bane

1972

5,748

20

.348

1973

6,555

23

.350

1974

5,980

81

1.355

1975

8,596

69

.803

1976

8,660

63

.727

1977

9,113

65

.713

1978

8,895

64

.720

1979

8,994

52

.578

1980

10,598

65

.613

1981

11,980

69

.576

Ten Year Average

8,512

57

.644

Critics of en bane review have also claimed that it is inefficient
due to the decisionmaking dynamics involved in full court rehearings.
Specifically, the critics assert that: (1) a full court "lacks the benefits
of small, flexible decision making conferences and rapid exchanges of
draft opinions;" 138 (2) larger groups of judges cannot function as efficiently as smaller groups; 139 and (3) "[c]ircuit judges, accustomed to
accommodating three views in panel decision, will be less skillful in
accommodating" the views of all their colleagues sitting en banc. 140
138. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 577.
139. See, e.g., Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 155 (remarks of Judge Kaufman) ("It is axiomatic that three judges, in an intimate conference, will find the heart of a case
more quickly than will 11."); Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 576 ("[T]hree judges is generally conceded to be the most efficient number for hearing appellate cases"); Madden, supra note
9, at 417 ("A court comprised of three judges can decide a case in less time than a court comprised of seven to fifteen judges.").
140. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 577. Thus, "[t]hree judges, in an intimate conference, will more quickly find the heart of a case than will seven or nine in a necessarily more
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Additionally, the critics assert the process of deciding whether to grant
en bane review is in itself time consuming because "[j]udicial time is
expended not only in deciding the in bane appeal but also in deciding
whether to support an in bane request initiated by a member of the
court." 141 Consequently, two Second Circuit judges have posited a direct correlation between a circuit's overall efficiency in disposing of appeals and the number of annual en bane rehearings granted, averring
that "[i]t is not accidental ... that the Second Circuit, which has the
lowest rate of rehearings in bane of all the circuits, is also the most
efficient circuit."142
Although more judges are involved in en bane review of a case
than in regular panel adjudication, it does not necessarily follow that
full court disposition is less efficient. Indeed, Professors Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager have shown that "given a reasonable
understanding of what the job of judging is and under reasonable assumptions about how well individual judges are likely to do it, enlarging the number of judges who sit on a court can be expected to improve
the court's [overall] performance." 143 This is because the aggregation
of judgments of a judicially consistent group of judges will create a
greater "consistency" in their decisions. 144
Moreover, the criticisms levelled at the perceived inefficiency of en
bane review based on the factors involved in aggregate decisionmaking
are overly broad and miss the point, for the number of cases reviewed
en bane, as well as the delays that ensue/45 ultimately "vary according
formal conference." /d. at 576. See also John J. Parker, Improving Appellate Methods, Address
before the American Political Science Assoc. (Dec. 28, 1949) in 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1950).
141. Newman, supra note 2, at 382. See also Solimine, supra note 2, at 38 ("The decision
to en bane also affects how and when judicial resources will be applied to the remaining cases on
the docket. Substantial delays can result, not only in rendering the en bane decision itself, but also
in other cases not being heard en bane.").
142. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 155 (remarks of Judge Kaufman); see
also Newman, supra note 2, at 382.
143. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82,
83 (1986).
144. See id. at 102-15 (explaining and diagramming the correlation). See also Solimine,
supra note 2, at 49 ("While Kornhauser and Sager do not specifically address en bane decisions,
their analysis applies usefully to that process.").
145. The extent of delay has not been resolved. See Second Circuit Conference, supra note
73, at 155 (remarks of Judge Kaufman) ("The interval between oral argument and in bane deposition [sic] is five times as great-<m average-as that for a panel disposition."); Alexander, Part
I, supra note 9, at 577 ("if the en bane court is substituted after some panel consideration of the
case, the average time elapsed from panel argument to en bane judgment quadruples"); Note,
supra note 2, at 1644 ("[c]ases initially heard en bane take approximately two-and-one-half to
three-and-one-half times longer than cases heard and disposed of by three-judge panels."); Note,
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to the size of the circuit, its workload, the complexity of its en bane
cases, the number and perhaps the individual characteristics of its active judges." 146 For example, although there are approximately the
same number of judges on the Second and D.C. Circuits/47 the judges
of the D.C. Circuit consistently hear more cases en bane than their
peers on the Second Circuit. 148 At least two reasons relating to individual circuit character explain this discrepancy. First, while the Second
Circuit prides itself on cordiality and a general reluctance to grant en
bane review of three-judge panel decisions/ 49 the judges on the D.C.
Circuit have been characterized as being embroiled in ideological division and often engage in heated disputes over the granting of en bane
review. 1110 Next, whereas the Second Circuit addresses a wide variety of
supra note 100, at 879 n.76 ("Three-judge panels can decide fifteen appeals for every case
reheard en bane." (citing N.Y. L.J., Sept. 17, 1984, at I, col. 4)).
146. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 576. See also Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra
note 64, at 171 ("The character of a circuit is a delicate composite of history, judges' personalities, distinct kinds of regional issues and problems, and even different types of counsel who appear
in court.").
147. See note 48, supra; Table VII, supra.
148. See Table II, supra.
149. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 2, at 384 ("Despite the occasions when each of us has
read a panel opinion with which we profoundly disagree, we have been able, to a remarkable
degree, to submerge our individual judicial convictions in the interest of the proper functioning of
our court."). See also Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Systems, Inc., 194 F.2d 422, 429 (2d Cir.
1951) (per curiam) (Clark, J., concurring) (stating that it is "the practice of this circuit never to
sit in bane.").
150. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Mikva,
J., dissenting) (lamenting that the majority "achieve[s] their results by distorting the statute
which governs this case"); Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 826 F.2d 1074, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1088 (1988)
(Mikva, J., dissenting) ("The majority's conclusions are marred at every step by skewed articulation of the facts and warped application of the law. The court today manages in one opinion to do
violence to principles of preclusion, retroactivity and statutory interpretation."); Bartlett ex rei.
Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Edwards, J., concurring in
denial of rehearing en bane) ("Collegiality cannot exist if every dissenting judge feels obliged to
lobby his or her colleagues to rehear the case en bane in order to vindicate that judge's position.");
id. at 1245 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en bane) ("To demonstrate that Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Dept., 812 F.2d 1425 (D.C. Cir 1987), warrants en bane attention, our dissenting colleagues indulge in much 'make believe' about that case and the precedent it
applies ... .").See also H. SCHWARTZ. PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN
TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION 155 (1988) ("Many cases in the District of Columbia Circuit
were en banced because the conservative majority on the circuit led by Judge Bork was unhappy
with the decision"). Judge Edwards has taken particular umbrage at these remarks. See Harry T.
Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS.
L. REv. 837, 849 [hereinafter Edwards, The Judicial Function] ("I have felt damned by an increasingly common image of the judiciary, and particularly of the D.C. Circuit, as a fundamentally political body.").
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conventional appeals/ 111 the D.C. Circuit's docket has a high concentration of administrative agency appeals 1112 and is often "the first, and usually the only, Article III court that will pass on the citizen's protest
against what he or she perceives to be an arbitrary bureaucracy." 1113
Because the D.C. Circuit may often be the only court to resolve the
important type of disputes that appear only before it, its occasional fervor relating to en bane cases, and its tendency to grant rehearing, are
not surprising.
The critics of en bane review have also asserted that once a rehearing has been granted, the logistics of en bane review, in which
judges often travel to their circuit "seat" to hear a case/ 114 further depletes the limited time of judges. 11111 This again exaggerates the cost of
reviewing cases en bane.
Although no formal internal operating procedure sets forth how
often, or where, en bane rehearings are held, it is the informal practice
of at least one circuit to designate a number of days each year in which
to hear oral argument on cases granted en bane rehearing. 1116 This
practice, if not already in place in other circuits, may be easily adopted
in order to minimize logistical inefficiencies, including judges' travel
time, that may be caused by full court rehearings. Alternatively, because circuit judges are required by statute to attend semi-annual
meetings of their judicial circuit/117 it is possible to schedule en bane
review of at least some cases around the time of these conferences in
151. The Second Circuit docket includes numerous cases arising under admiralty law and
the Jones Act. See, e.g., Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 588 ("[H]alf of all federal admiralty
and Jones Act claims are begun in Second Circuit trial courts ...").
152. One commentator notes that "[o]ne-fourth of all federal agency review cases reach the
D.C. Circuit, far more than any other circuit." Egger, supra note 100, at 479 n.46 (1990). A. Leo
Levin, Uniformity of Federal Law, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 64, at 138 (The D.C. Circuit "has exclusive venue on appeals in F.C.C. cases
... and in cases growing out of a whole roster of other statutes.").
153. Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, at 172.
154. See 28 U.S.C § 48(a), which governs the "seating" or terms of court.
155. See, e.g., Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 577 ("[A]ssembling the judges en bane
from among the several states of the[ir] ... circuits may add to delay.").
156. This practice has been a standard procedure in the Third Circuit. See Letter from
Chief Judge Dolores K. Sloviter to Michael A. Stein (August 8, 1992) (noting that "[i]t seems to
me self-evident that when a court votes to in bane more than one case, they would be scheduled on
the same day") (on file with the author).
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1988) (requiring each circuit's chief judge to "call, at least
twice in each year and at such places as he may designate, a meeting of the judicial council of the
circuit").
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order to reduce expenditure of judicial resources further. It is also possible to limit the scope of en bane rehearings to specific issues of law. 168
Finally, because approximately one in six en bane cases are decided "on the briefs" without oral argument, they do not require the
circuit judges to convene in a single place. Instead, the judges can either conference call or exchange electronic mail, faxes or memoranda.
In fact, many circuits do not even require oral argument in cases they
rehear en banc. 169
B.

Finality

A second criticism of en bane rehearings is that they threaten the
finality of three-judge panel decisions. 16° Critics of en bane review argue that the grant of appellate rehearing vacating an original panel
decision "squarely contradicts the principle that there shall be one, final decision of the court of appeals" 161 and that vacating an original
panel decision indicates "that decisions reached by three-judge panels
are not final but represent merely one step on an elongated appellate
158. See, e.g., lOTH CJR. INTER. OPER. P. IX(6) ("the rehearing may be limited as to particular issues"); 9TH CJR. R. 35-3(5) ("If any issues have been isolated for specific attention, the
order may also set forth those issues."). The Second Circuit has ruled that an appeal may be
heard en bane with respect to a particular issue. See New York v. 11 Cornwell Co., 718 F.2d 22,
24 (2d Cir. 1983) (en bane on cross-appeal for attorney's fees); Daye v. Att'y Gen. of New York,
696 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 1982) (en bane on exhaustion of state remedies).
159. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 2, at 369 ("An in bane rehearing in the Second Circuit
does not require oral argument." (quoting S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301,
1309-10 (2d Cir. 1971)). In addition, some circuits allow en bane courts to affirm a panel decision
without opinion. See, e.g., United Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Rule 36.1.
Rule 36.1 provides:
When the court determines that any of the following circumstances exist: (a) judgment of
the district court is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous; (b) the evidence in support of a jury verdict is sufficient; {c) the order of an administrayive agency is
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; (d) summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment on the pleadings is supported by the record; (e) judgment has
been entered without an error of law; and an opinion would have no precedential value, the
judgment or order may be affirmed or enforced without opinion.
160. See, e.g., Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 599 ("the more serious objection to an en
bane rehearing is its unsettling effect on finality of panel decisions."); Note, supra note 2, at 1645
("Finality is also impaired by the availability of en bane rehearings."). But see Maris, supra note
41, at 96 ("A decision ... made by a majority of all the judges of the court in bane obviously has
much greater authority").
161. Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 600.
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TABLE V
Percentage of En Bane Cases
Decided on the Briefs
1982-1991
Year

Total
En Bane
Decisions

Number of
Cases En
Bane Decided
After Oral
Argument

Number
on the
Briefs

% of Cases

1982

74

68

6

8.1

1983

66

56

10

15.2

1984

106

95

11

10.4

1985

85

76

9

10.6

1986

90

71

19

21.1

1987

88

73

15

17.0

1988

117

92

25

21.4

1989

98

81

18

18.4

1990

85

64

21

24.7

1991

89

75

14

15.7

Ten Year
Average

90

75

15

16.3

En Bane
Decided on
the Briefs

ladder." 162 It has also been suggested that "[t]he possibility that the
decision of a three-judge panel may be overruled by an en bane court
may result in routine suggestions for an en bane [re]hearing by the
losing party."163
It must again be pointed out that en bane rehearings constitute
little more than one half of one percent of all federal appellate court
decisions. 164 Thus, even if the critics are correct that rehearing a three162. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 157 (remarks of Judge Irving R.
Kaufman).
163. Note, supra note 2, at 1645.
164. See Table III supra.
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judge panel decision en bane goes against the principle of one final appellate decision-a vastly overstated proposition-the infrequency with
which cases are reviewed en bane moots this point. Moreover, however
distasteful it might be for any particular judge to have her opinion
overruled, it is a normal facet of judicial life that on occasion, a judge's
decision will be overturned at the next level of review. 1615
The critics have also asserted that en bane decisions erode finality
of circuit law 166 and that they tend to generate multiple opinions, often
with dissents, 167 resulting "in ambiguously worded compromise decisions accompanied by a host of concurring and dissenting opinions that
165. For example, of the appealed district court opinions terminated on the merits by the
courts of appeals in 1991, 11% were reversed, 79% were affirmed, 6% were dismissed, and 3%
were remanded back to the district courts. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1991). Similarly, during the last Supreme Court term, the
Court reversed 34.6%, vacated 47.4%, and affirmed 41% of the cases it reviewed from the courts
of appeals. See The Statistics of the Supreme Court 1991 Term, 105 HARV. L. REV. 419 (1991).
166. See, e.g., Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 156 (remarks of Judge Kaufman) (en bane cases tend to produce "either a majority opinion that was created in purposefully
vague manner to forge a consensus within the court, or a litany of diverging opinions, injecting a
degree of uncertainty into the law that we can well do without."); Newman, supra note 2, at 383
(en bane decisions frequently produce "either a single majority opinion that is deliberately vague
to key points in order to gain broad support within a court, or several opinions that express the
differing views of groups of judges unable to join a definitive majority opinion."). It is ironic that
Judges Kaufman and Newman would be critical of forging panel consensus, given their professed
favor of this practice. See Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 158 (remarks of Judge
Kaufman) (noting with approval the practice of "subordinating personal views to the institutional
needs for certainty and finality."); Newman, supra note 2, at 384 ("Despite the occasions when
each of us has read a panel opinion with which we profoundly disagree, we have been able, to a
remarkable degree, to submerge our individual judicial convictions in the interest of the proper
functioning of our court.").
167. For example, one pair of commentators reported that during 1983 and 1984, approximately two-thirds of all en bane opinions issued by the D.C. Circuit contained a dissent. See
Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 74, at 541. This figure is significantly higher than the overall
dissent rate on the D.C. Circuit of 6%. See Edwards, Public Misconceptions Concerning the
Politics of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. CoLO. L. REV. 619,
642 (I 985); see a/so Ruth B. Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Wlzy, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 205,
212 nn.35-36 (1985). The results of a more representative study, which examined each of the 282
published en bane decisions rendered by the Courts of Appeals from 1985 through 1987, reported
that only about one quarter of the published opinions contained either a concurrence or dissent.
See Solimine, supra note 2, at 61. Professor Solimine has also suggested that the higher rate of
dissent on en bane, as compared to panel decisions, may be inevitable. See id. at 46-47 n.92 ("On
a panel of three judges, two will almost always agree on something even if all three reach decisions by flipping coins. Accordingly, the rate of dissent on a panel is given by the rate of dissent on
any single judge. If each judge on the panel goes along with any given colleagues 90% of the
time, panels will be unanimous in 90% of the cases. The probability of unanimity falls as the size
of the court increases." (citing Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 143, at 99-100 (discussing Supreme Court voting behavior on certiorari))).
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give subsequent panels ammunition for distinguishing or ignoring the
en bane decision. " 168
The assertion that multiple opinions impede finality of circuit law
lacks merit. Regardless of the number of opinions contained in a decision, the majority's ruling controls. 169 Multiple opinions are also the
usual method by which the Supreme Court announces its rulings/ 70 yet
no one would claim that as multiple opinions they make the Court's
rulings less dispositive.
Moreover, the "evils" of separate opinions "have been overstated."171 Because multiple opinions generally make individual judges'
positions on specific issues more readily comprehensible and predictable, instead of eroding finality they add "considerable rationality, continuity, and legitimacy to the decision making process."172 This is especially true of dissenting opinions, because "a judge can write her
dissent just the way she wants; she need not defer to a colleague's sensibilities in order to gain a needed vote. The dissenter can thus be an
unabashed advocate." 173 Consequently, "[s]ome of our greatest jurisr68. Note, supra note 100, at 877.
169. Admittedly, one way en bane cases can fail to achieve uniformity is when an en bane
panel is evenly split. Under those circumstances, the original trial court decision is reinstated, and
the opportunity for a full appellate court to issue an opinion on the state of the law is lost. See,
e.g., Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Federal Energy Admin., 591 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979); Bankers Life Co. v. United States, 587 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1978);
Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Holmes, 537
F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d. Cir. 1973); United States
v. Walden, 458 F.2d 36 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ard. v. United States, 409 U.S. 867
(1972); Allegheny Corp. v. Kirby, 340 F.2d 311 {2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed sub nom. Holt v.
Allegheny Corp., 384 U.S. 28 {1966).
170. For example, the 120 written opinions of the Court's 1991 term included 95 dissents
and 47 concurrences. See The Statistics of the Supreme Court 1991 Term, supra note 165. Prior
tabulations may be found in the annual November issues of that publication.
171. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 743 (1987).
172. Note, supra note 2, at 1655.
173. Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 495. Dissents may also potentially influence
a judge's peers-or even a higher court-to modify their views. For example, Judge Wald has
described how some judges, through the use of "invitational dissents," have played a "John the
Baptist" role in the evolution of the law. See id. at 495 & n.54 (citing ROBERT J. GLENNON,
JEROME FRANK: ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER 181-82 {1985)). Brennan's biography of Judge Frank
chronicles how Judge Frank's dissenting position in a Fourth Amendment issue was eventually
vindicated by the Supreme Court. See also Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 493 n.51
("it is not at all uncommon to see a dissenter singled out for recognition in Supreme Court opinions."); Interaction and Decisionmaking on Collegial Courts: A Panel Discussion, 71 JuDICATURE
339, 342 (Apr. 1988) ("Over 77 percent of the responses [from a comprehensive study] indicated
that a dissenter frequently or sometimes causes the majority to alter its original opinion." (remarks of Professor John W. Cooley)).
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prudence has been introduced into the law in the form of dissents and
expressions of minority views." 174
C.

Collegiality

A third criticism of en bane rehearings is that they erode collegiality among the members of a circuit. It is asserted that some judges
regard a vote in favor of rehearing a case upon which they sat as a
personal insult, 175 and that even the prospect of an en bane rehearing
deals a heavy blow to the psyches of the judges constituting a threejudge panel whose decision will become the focus of the full court's
attention. 176 Similarly, it has also been asserted that "en bane reversals
amount to a vote of no confidence in the three-judge panel that already
decided the appeal." 177
Despite any bruised feelings that might be engendered, en bane
review is required by the institutional norm that judges speak and vote
their conscience because they may not "properly sacrifice openness and
candor for the sake of other goals." 178 This is not to say that judges
may not compromise in either writing or in joining an opinion, for it is
undeniable that a certain amount of give-and-take is necessary in order
174. Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, at 176. This is because "[t]he dissenting
opinion provides insight into judicial attitudes usually not found in opinions for the court." Douglas 0. Linder, How Judges Judge: A Study of Disagreement on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 38 ARK. L. REV. 479, 481 (1985). See also PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 15 (1969) ("It is the dissenter who dares
to be outspoken .•..").
175. See, e.g., Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 486; Alexander, Part I, supra
note 9, at 543; Linder, supra note 174, at 487 ("[E]n bane cases more frequently generate 'bad
feelings' than do panel cases."). But see COFFIN, supra note 86, at 174 ("In these differences and
in the process of criticism, response, and resolution lies the virtue of the appellate process.").
176. See, e.g., Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 157 (remarks of Judge Kaufman); Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, at 181 ("En banes generate the highest personal tensions on a court • . . losing an en bane is a bitter pill, since the entire court is now on
record the other way.").
177. Note, supra note 100, at 880. See also Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, at
181 ("When a full court is asked to en bane a panel opinion, collegiality is at its greatest risk.").
178. See Shapiro, supra note 171, at 731. See also Guido Calabresi, Bakke as PseudoTragedy, 28 CATH. U. L. REv. 427, 428-30 (1979); Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and
the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv.
169, 236·41 (1968); L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, (Parts 1-3) 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 513 & 877
(1931); Grant Gilmore, Law, Lagic and Experience, 3 How. L.J. 26, 37-38 (1957); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. I, 17 n.29 (1934). Cf. Scott Altman,
Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 296, 299-326 (1990) (arguing that the belief in law is partially
se)f.fulfilling and that introspection, in addition to candor, threatens those partially self-fulfilling
beliefs).
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to reach a case disposition that is mutually agreeable to all involved. 179
Nor would anyone disagree about the important role that collegiality
plays on a court. Certainly one of the most crucial aspects of "running
an appellate court is maintaining an atmosphere in which judges can
agree or disagree on substance free of personality clashes or risk of
personal reprisal. " 180
Professor Cooley has written at length on the dynamics of appellate decisionmaking:
The judge's performance of the problem solving function in a small group, for
example at the appellate level, is a much more complex, and indeed a more sophisticated, type of negotiation. It requires the delicate intermeshing of the separate problem solving functions of several persons, taking into account, at the very
least, their personalities, their philosophies, their varying intellectual and interpersonal abilities, and their individual biases and prejudices formed through varying backgrounds and experience, both legal and nonlegal. "Appellate decision
making," if used to describe what appellate judges primarily do, is really a misnomer. It describes only part of the appellate judge's function, omitting the more
difficult and perhaps more important behavioral aspects of the function-the creative, generative, persuasive, interpersonal tasks. Indeed, what we all have long
believed to be "appellate decision making" is truly negotiation on a higher
plane. 181

Judge Edwards' insights are also worth quoting at length:
When judges respect one another and are amicable in their dealings, the decisionmaking process runs smoothly: the judges' post-hearing conference focuses on
the applicable legal precedent and record facts, with each judge openly airing
concerns about difficulties seen with the case; there are post-conference memoranda and discussions between chambers which are thoughtful and helpful in
narrowing the issues before the panel and in pursuing the correct answer to the
case; if and when the judge who is assigned to write the case runs into unexpected difficulties, these matters are discussed with judicial colleagues with an
aim to reaching a mutually satisfactory accord; and, once a draft opinion is circulated, comments from judicial colleagues are given to improve the opinion, e.g.,
to correct record citations, to question applications of circuit precedent and to
179.. "Certainly, the art of compromise is not out of place in the halls of justice." Shapiro,

supra note 171, at 743. See also Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 295 N.W.2d 523,
525 (Minn. 1980) ("In the collegial decision making of an appellate court an individual judge's
purely personal views are of less significance than they would be in a. trial court and he is subject
to collegial restraint should he be inclined to act on them . . . .") (quoting ABA STANDARDS OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS§ 3.42 (1977 draft));
Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 503 ("The search for consensus is a vital part of the
dynamics of any decisionmaking body.").
180. Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, at 178. See also Frank H. Easterbrook,
Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 807-11 (1982).
181. John W. Cooley, How Decisions Are Made in Appellate Courts, THE JuDGES' J.,
Spring 1987, at 3.
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offer suggestions for language changes where the draft opinion is unclear. There
is no enmity in this process; there are no hidden political agendas at stake; there
are no ideological leanings affecting the dialogue between the judges.182

Nevertheless, as Professor David Shapiro has noted, "the sticking
point can and should be an unwillingness to make or join in a statement that does not represent the judge's views and that will mislead the
opinion's readers as to what those views are." 183 Under those circumstances, strict institutional integrity obligates individual judges to vote
for rehearing of three-judge panel decisions that do not represent their
understanding of the law. 184
Ultimately, the determination of whether certain portions of a proposed opinion adequately "represent the judge's views" 185 receives
much latitude from the individual judges themselves, as judges often
disagree over whether "mere" disagreement is sufficient cause to overturn a panel decision en banc. 188 A striking example of how individual
judges may disagree over whether en bane is necessary in any particular case is provided by Bartlett ex rei. Neuman v. Bowen. 187 In Bartlett, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on its own motion reconsidered appellees' suggestions for en bane rehearing of a panel decision
that consolidated three appeals; vacated its previous orders granting en
bane rehearing of the consolidated panel decision, and reinstated the
182. Edwards, The Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 858.
183. Shapiro, supra note 171, at 743. See also SAMUEL EsTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON,
REDEFJNING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE 57 (1986) ("Disuniformity in the law becomes intolerable when litigants are . . . unable readily to adjust their affairs to the law's divergent commands."); Easterbrook, supra note 180, at 807-08 ("The assertion that it is 'beneficial' to write
skeletal opinions in order to obtain more agreement is dubious."); Interaction and Decisionmaking
on Collegial Courts: A Panel Discussion (remarks of Justice Seymour Simon), supra note 173, at
340 ("If you get a lot of dissenting opinions, so be it; I think that's the way the law grows and if
collegiality means a great effort toward unanimity, who needs it.").
184. Note, Playing with Numbers, supra note 58, at 1510 n.32 ("[T]he en bane mechanism
is always available to judges who merely disagree with a circuit panel's decision.").
185. Shapiro, supra note 171, at 743.
186. Compare Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 312 F.2d 893, 894 (2d Cir. 1963)
(en bane) ("Mere disagreement, or likelihood of disagreement, with the panel decision, has not
generally been regarded as sufficient reason for a further hearing . . .") with United States v.
Singleton, 763 F.2d 1432, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Edwards J., concurring in denial of rehearing
en bane despite his "find[ing] it difficult to subscribe to the panel's decision"). Moreover, one pair
of commentators finds disuniformity in the federal court system expected, tolerable, and sometimes even beneficial, because it allows issues to "percolate" and undergo a thorough analysis in
lower courts before reaching the appellate or Supreme Court level. See EsTREICHER & SEXTON,
supra note 183, at 50-52.
187. 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane).
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original panel decisions. 188 Although the judges concurring and dissenting to the denial of rehearing en bane agreed that no single opinion
could represent every judge's view / 89 they vehemently disagreed
whether the original three-judge panel decision was a "sweeping and
revolutionary decision" 190 or one which "merely follows well-established Supreme Court precedent."191
As a practical matter, jurisprudential rigidity is tempered by collegial considerations, and "the most effective antidote" against unwarranted en bane reconsideration of a case still remains "the very human
desire of judges to coexist in peace. " 192
Finally, it is worth noting that some judges believe rehearings induce collegiality. For example, Judge James R. Browning of the Ninth
Circuit has reported that members of his circuit "thoroughly enjoy participating in en bane proceedings" and in fact view en bane gatherings
as an "opportunity for interchange that leads to improved personal
communication and to the development of the attitude of trust and respect that is essential to judicial deliberation." 193 In fact,
188. Id. at 1240-42.
189. See id. at 1244 (Edwards, J., concurring in denial of rehearings en bane) ("Obviously,
no judge agrees with all of the decisions handed down in the circuit, nor would every judge write a
particular opinion in the same fashion."); id. at 1253 (Starr, J., dissenting from vacatur of orders)
("Whether a particular exercise of judicial judgment is sound or not is itself, I recognize, peculiarly a matter of judgment. There is apt to be no incontestably 'right' answer if the issue is truly
one entrusted to the exercise of a court's judgment. What is right and meet will depend in large
measure upon one's conception of what is appropriate and proper under the circumstances.").
190. 824 F.2d at 1248 (Bork, Starr, Buckley, Williams and D.H. Ginsburg, J.J., dissenting
from the vacatur of orders and from denial of rehearings en bane). The polemics were sufficiently
heated to gain national attention. See Karpay, En Bane Furor, Liberal Fury, AM. LAW., May/
June 1988, 10 (special supplement) (noting "the commitment of many Reagan appellate appointees to leave their ideological fingerprints on as many key decisions as possible."). Ironically for
those critics who assert that many judges vote in favor·of en bane because of ideological considerations, see infra, the "swing" vote which ultimately vacated the previous orders in favor of en
bane rehearings, was cast by a Reagan appointee. See Bartlett ex rei. Neuman, 824 F.2d at 1246
(Silberman, J., concurring in denial of rehearings en bane) ("I am the one who, upon reflection,
has reconsidered his views.").
191. ld. at 1242-43 (Edwards, J., concurring in denial of rehearings en bane).
192. Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 488. These considerations often result in
the balancing of otherwise competing values. See Interaction and Decisionmaking on Collegial
Courts: A Panel Discussion, supra note 173, at 342 (remarks of Professor Geoffrey Miller) ("I
think that judges and justices want it both ways. At times most of them have enormous collegiality and stick to the view that this is the law and we want unanimity. On the other hand, when it
suits their purposes or interests, then it is their responsibility to disagree.").
193. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 163 (remarks of Judge Browning). Other
judges share Judge Browning's view. See, e.g., Maris, supra note 41, at 96-97 ("The Circuit
Judges of the Third Circuit think that [the en bane] procedure has been very helpful in maintaining the very high esprit de corps which they enjoy."). The differing attitudes towards en bane
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"[i]nstitutional harmony may be advanced by permitting judges to participate in important cases about which they have strong feelings." 194
D.

Ideology

Finally, a recent group of critics has asserted that the Reagan and
Bush appointees, who comprise a majority of the present federal appellate judiciary/915 are actively turning the jurisprudence of their circuits
to the right. 196 This second group of critics argue that one way the new
conservative majorities achieve their ideological goals is by granting rehearings in order to overrule fundamental constitutional decisions rendered earlier by more liberally-minded panels. 197 For example, one
commentator, reiterating criticisms made in other publications, asserts
that the changed political composition of the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth
Circuits has yielded an increased use of en bane review to override established circuit caselaw/ 98 thereby compromising "important judicial
values. " 199
rehearings may ultimately be due to the fact that "[c]ollegiality is not a matter of numbers."
Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 159 (remarks of Judge Browning).
194. Note, supra note 2, at 1649 (emphasis added).
195. As of October 1992, 92 of 145-a1most two-thirds of all federal circuit judges-had
been appointed by either President Reagan or Bush.
196. See, e.g., Stephen Wermiel, Full-Court Review of Panel Rulings Becomes Tool Often
Used by Reagan Judges Aiming to Mold Law, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1988, at 70, col. I (declaring that en bane review "has become a weapon for some Reagan appointees seeking to steer
federal courts in a more conservative direction."); ScHWARTZ. supra note 150 ("Many cases in
the District of Columbia Circuit were en banced because the conservative majority on the circuit
led by Judge Bork was unhappy with the decision, and there are indications that this is happening
in other circuits as well."). But see Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1179, 1180 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Ripple, J., dissenting from granting hearing en bane) ("Certainly, no member of the court believes, I hope, than an en bane proceeding may be used as a vehicle to permit judges to further
their own ideological predilections.").
I 97. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 2, at 32 (concluding "that over one-half of the cases"
[reviewed by en bane from 1980 to 1987] should not have been decided by the full court."); Note,
supra note 100, at 874 (criticizing "the emergence of a trend towards the use of en bane review to
advance ideological and partisan goals."); Noreen Marcus, Rule of Law (and Economics), AM.
LAWYER, June 1988, at 39 (special supplement) ("The conservative majority is using en banes to
say to the liberals, 'You'd better get in line. We're running the show now.'"); Ann Woolner, Tug
of War Gets Intense, AM. LAWYER, June 1988, at 34 (special supplement) (dichotomous partisan
appointment "has led to a deeply divided court replete with spats among the judges and bitter
battles over en bane rehearings that often turn the tables on panel decisions and even on
precedent.'').
198. See Note, supra note 100, at 874-75. As of October 1992, 9 of the 14 active Sixth
Circuit Court judges, 7 of the 10 active Sixth Circuit judges, and 8 of the 10 active Eighth Circuit
Court judges had been appointed by either President Reagan or Bush.
199. Note, supra note 100, at 866.
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TABLE VI
Number of Active Reagan/Bush
Appointed Circuit Judges
Circuit

Number of
Active Judges

Number of Reagan/Bush Appointees

D.C.

11

7

First

4

3

Second

12

8

Third

11

10

Fourth

13

6

Fifth

13

11

Sixth

14

9

Seventh

10

7

Eighth

10

8

Ninth

28

14

Tenth

10

6

9

4

145

92

Eleventh
Total

There are several flaws in these assertions. First, the critics' assertions of conspiratorial jurisprudence fail when examined in light of the
contrary evidence that has been assembled. For example, a thorough
study of the en bane voting patterns of circuit judges by Professor
Michael Solimine concluded that "[t]he data do not support the charge
that the Reagan-appointed judges are using the en bane procedure as
an ideological tool. " 200 In addition, the assertions made just do not
200. Solimine, supra note 2, at 62. See also Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, Note,
All the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 766, 791 (1987) (concluding that "Reagan judges do not appear to be
more conservative in their judicial decision-making than their Republican colleagues."); Joan M.
Cheever & Edward Frost, A Reagan Star Shines Bright on the 'Hot Bench', AM. LAW., June
I 988, at 17 (special supplement) ("The idea that appointees of any administration, including
[Reagan's], have significantly changed the day-to-day decision making of the courts is vastly overstated." (quoting Judge Jon 0. Newman)); Freiwald, The Mission: Stock Bench, AM. LAW.,
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stand up to numerical scrutiny, for they cannot account for why the
Second Circuit, whose twelve members include eight Reagan/Bush appointees,201 consistently has among the fewest annual en bane
rehearings. 202
Moreover, these criticisms are based upon the postulate that
judges vote in blocs that can be directly correlated to party affiliation.203 Consequently, both an individual judge's position, and by extension those of her similarly appointed colleagues, can be predicted in
advance. The validity of such a jurisprudential litmus test is at best
debatable. 204
Certainly, presidents have historically chosen federal court judges
whom they believe will uphold their own party's general philosophical
outlook. 205 It is, however, incorrect to aver that on any given issue all
Mayf June 1988, 7 (special supplement) ("Reagan judges rarely vote in blocs"); Susan D. Rice,
Earl Warren Would Blush, AM. LAW., MayfJune 1988, 46 (special supplement) ("In 95 percent
of the cases, it doesn't make a difference whether you're a Republican, a Democrat, or a radical.
You arrive at the same result." (quoting Judge Browning)).
201. As of this writing, the Second Circuit had one vacancy. For a list of the authorized
number of appellate judges per circuit, see note 48, supra.
202. See Table I, supra.
203. One of the first individuals to study judges' voting patterns was Professor Sheldon
Goldman, a political scientist who reviewed the voting behavior of federal appellate court judges
and concluded that "an element of justice-by-lottery is inherent in the three member panel device." Sheldon Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968
Wis. L. REV. 461, 481. This thesis was in turn sharply criticized by Judge Henry J. Friendly, who
cautioned that the reader of Goldman's article "should not draw from these figures, relating to a
small fraction of the cases decided by the courts of appeals, a conviction that judges regularly vote
on ideological lines." See Friendly, supra note 78, at 677. Subsequent studies have buttressed
Judge Friendly's position. See, e.g., J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEAL IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS
160-88 ( 1981) (study of appellate judge voting found that judges tend to vote along lines of duty
rather than along lines of political preconceptions); Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges' Attributes and Case Characteristics: An Alternative Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 JUDICATURE 277 (1988) (identifying correlation in voting patterns by prestige of education, political and prior judicial experience, and specific judicial viewpoints.); Edwards, The
Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 854 ("There is simply no significant statistical support for
[the] underlying . . . premise that judicial results invariably flow from judges' politics, rather
than from legal principles.").
204. Judge Edwards has lamented the prevalence of this premise as well. See Edwards, The
Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 849-50 ("This vision of a politicized judiciary, in which
cases are decided on ideological grounds and judges defined by their partisan affiliations, seems to
grow more popular each year. By now, it is almost taken for granted by much of the media, and
doubtlessly accepted as truth by significant portions of the bar and the public as well.").
205. See, e.g., Justin J. Green, Parameters of Dissensus on Shifting Small Groups, in JuDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS 139, 150 (Sheldon Goldman & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1986)
("[The] party of the appointing president would be the best variable to adopt as a surrogate
measure of political ideology."); Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, at 178
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judges appointed by the same political party, or even for that matter by
the same president, will always reach the same conclusion, even if that
is often the result. 206 Such a premise is based upon faulty methodological assumptions for it ignores the unique nature of judges in both their
individual capacity and as collective bodies. For example, in the Bartlett decision discussed above, Judge Laurence H. Silberman, an otherwise rather conservative Reagan-appointee, reconsidered his views and
voted alongside his democratic-appointed colleagues on reconsideration
of the court's previous orders granting rehearings. 207 Indeed, the characterization of judges voting along strictly ideological lines, has been
ardently rejected by Judge Edwards, one of the "victims" of the conservatives' alleged tactics, who asserts that "members of the federal
judiciary strive, most often successfully, to decide cases in accord with
the law rather than with their own ideological or partisan preferences."208 Judge Edwards has also noted that the more judges are depicted as engaging in political or result-oriented decisionmaking, the
greater the likelihood that these accusations will be believed regardless
of their intrinsic validity.209
Second, even if judges were inclined to vote along party affiliation
lines, it is by no means clear that the decision to vote in favor of rehearing a case is motivated by political, rather than jurisprudential,
concerns. 210 The same circuit judge who avowed that there are circuit
("[P]residents overwhelmingly choose judges with sympathetic philosophies. . . ."). For an examination of the possible congruence of political party affiliation and voting patterns, see generally
Richard A. Brisbin, Federal Courts and the Changing Role of American Political Parties, 5 N.
ILL. U. L. REv. 31 (1984); John C. Danforth, The Federal Judiciary and Partisan Politics, 4 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 199 (1984); Goldman, supra note 203, at 481.
206. See, e.g., Edwards, The Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 854 ("It is absolutely
false, however, that judges' politics routinely determine the outcomes of cases.").
207. Bartlett ex rei. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Silberman,
J., concurring in the denial of rehearings en bane).
208. Edwards, The Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 838.
209. See Edwards, The Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 838-39 (asserting that
"[e]ven if judges are able to resist the temptation to conform to the false perception, continued
assessments of judicial performance in political terms will promote a 'new reality,' for most people
will come to believe that the judicial function is nothing more than a political enterprise.").
210. This postulate has become the foundation of the critical legal studies movement. See,
e.g., Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 563, 571-72
(1983) (castigating the notion that legal doctrine and principled decisionmaking may be distinguished from "open-ended ideology."). Interestingly, many of the judges who are presumably the
subject of this scholarship, disagree with its conclusion. See, e.g., Edwards, The Judicial Function,
supra note 150, at 838 ("[M]embers of the federal judiciary strive, most often successfully, to
decide cases in accord with the law rather than with their own ideological or partisan preferences."); Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge's Response to the Critical Legal Studies
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judges "who believe it is their duty to seek in bane reconsideration of
every opinion that has decided a significant issue contrary to their judicial views," 211 acknowledged at the same time that "[t]here is frequently room for honest difference of opinion about whether a panel
decision is really at variance with a precedent of the circuit or merely
looking the other way on distinguishable facts." 212
Most importantly, even if it could be shown that certain judges
decide cases based upon "political considerations,"213 such action
hardly "compromises ... important judicial values." 214 This is because
"political considerations" themselves account for a good many of these
critics' assertions, and are often the result of intense scrutiny by anticonservative commentators to the voting patterns of judges recently appointed by Republican administrations.215 Thus, as one commentator
has suggested, perhaps someone "should remind the critics who charge
the Reagan appointees with political use of the en bane process of the
danger of throwing stones from glass houses. " 216
Further, these criticisms are based upon unfair assumptions.
Under their scheme, the critics of en bane review consider liberal decisions rendered by panels composed of a majority of Democrat-appointed judges neutral, while the reversals of these decisions by circuits
composed of a majority of Republican-appointed judges are labelled
Movement, 37 J. LEGAL Eouc. 307, 307-08 {1987) ("My conclusions are that legal doctrine is a
real force, judges follow it, and they decide all but a small fraction of the cases that come before
them in accordance with what they perceive to be the controlling legal rules.").
211. Newman, supra note 2, at 384. See also Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at
483 ("[T]here are judges ... who, as a point of honor, seek to en bane every case they lost at the
panel stage.").
212. Newman, supra note 2, at 370-71. See also Solimine, supra note 2, at 40 n.53 ("Reasonable judges can disagree over whether different panel decisions in fact conflict." (citing Klein v.
Stop-N-Go, 824 F.2d 453, 453 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (accusing
the panel majority with creating an intracircuit conflict))) and Bartlett ex rei. Neuman v. Bowen,
824 F.2d 1240, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Bork, Buckley, D. Ginsburg, Starr & Williams, JJ., dissenting from denial of en bane rehearings) (asserting that since there was a conflict in the panel
decisions, the case ought to be heard en bane.); Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 491
("Judges honestly differ about whether the facts distinguishing one case from another, despite
common principles, are material enough to justify or even dictate a different result.").
213. See, e.g., Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 479 ("[I]n the high visibility
cases, involving controversial social or 'moral' issues, our differences in judicial philosophy, on the
proper role of the courts in a democratic society, do emerge front and center.").
214. Note, supra note 100, at 866.
215. "[T]he recent shift in composition of the courts, has focused attention on the purported
motivations and strategic behavior of the appellate judges deciding cases en bane." Solimine,
supra note 2, at 29 n.5.
216. ld. at 47-48.
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ideologicaJ.2 17 As one circuit judge has noted, "[s]o entrenched is the
political vision of the circuit court that commentators can find partisan
overtones in even quite neutral court activities." 218 There are, however,
other less extreme, and in fact politically neutral methods, for depicting
the conduct of federal court judges. 219 For example, Professor Richard
Fallon has characterized the traditionally opposite approaches to the
assertion of power by federal courts over state courts as an ideological
struggle between the advocates of "Federalist" and "Nationalist" theories,220 without passing judgment on the validity of the jurisprudence of
either group.
Finally, even if the jurisprudential outlook of the collective circuits
has become more conservative, this does not mean that institutional
values have been compromised, for it is normal that "gradually and
subtly, the jurisprudence of a court reflects the politics of the nation."221 Because appointments to the federal judiciary have been in the
217. One D.C. Circuit Court judge offers the following example:
a decision not to reconsider a panel ruling allowing Eastern Airlines to furlough thousands
of employees is described as a win for "the Reagan appointees" and a defeat for "the
liberals"; the same story, in an effort at a novel brand of nonpartisanship, is quick to point
out that "the conservatives were the losers last October," when "[flour Reagan appointees
lost a bid to rehear a decision" involving attorney's fees.
Edwards, The Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 850, citing Eastern Case Stirs D.C. Circuit
Discord, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 16, 1989, at 12. The literature is replete with other examples. See,
e.g., Note, supra note 100, at 880 ("[I]deological use of en bane review ... introduces the hazard of result-oriented manipulation at another level and is worth excising when no strong reasons
justify its use."); Bernard Weinraub, Reagan Says He'll Use Vacancies to Discourage Judicial
Activism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1985, at AI (reporting that Harvard Law Professor Laurence H.
Tribe believes that Reagan has been "stacking . . . the Federal judiciary" with individuals "handpicked to serve. a concrete social and political agenda."); Tom Wicker, Splendid for Starters, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 1986, at A31 (referring to Reagan appointees as "rigid ideologues").
218. Edwards, The Judicial Function, supra note 150, at 852.
219. See Simonett, supra note 81, at 207 ("There is a large variety of labels for judges:
liberal or conservative, innovator or traditionalist, strict or loose constructionist, pragmatist or
idealist, activist or nonactivist. But labels are little more than that. . . ."). .
220. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv.
1141, 1143-46 {1988). Under the Federalist model "states emerge as sovereign entities against
which federal courts should exercise only limited powers, and state courts, which are presumed to
be as fair and competent as federal courts, stand as the ultimate guarantors of constitutional
rights." Id. at 1143-44 (citations omitted). By contrast, the Nationalist model posits that "state
sovereignty interests must yield to the vindication of federal rights and that, because state courts
should not be presumed as competent as federal courts to enforce constitutional liberties, rights to
have federal issues adjudicated in a federal forum should be construed broadly." Id. at 1145
(citations omitted). According to Fallon, Federalist jurists include Chief Justices Rehnquist and
Burger, Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, and Powell, while Nationalist jurists include JustiCes Brennan and Marshall and Judge Gibbons. Id. at 1146.
221. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging, supra note 125, at 894.
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hands of Republican administrations for all but four of the last twenty
years, it is to be expected that new appointees would eventually gain
majority status within most of the circuits and begin to assert their
particular jurisprudential views. It is natural that "[c]ircuit court majorities come and go with the administration in power"222 and therefore
it is to be expected that after a period of time in the other direction,
the judicial "pendulum swings back toward a more stable-if different-body of circuit precedent." 223 As discussed above, 224 it is proper
that a circuit should follow the understanding of the law held by the
majority of its members regardless of ideological consequences. Finally,
it points to the political bent of the critics themselves that none voiced
concern when "[a]s a result of the addition of the new judges during
President Carter's administration," the Ninth Circuit, which had been
"a rather conservative court of appeals was converted into a rather liberal one." 2215

E.

Proposals to Improve En Bane Review

The use of en bane rehearings may be increased by ensuring that
all circuits in the federal judiciary interpret the number of judges necessary to grant rehearing as a majority of the active available circuit
court judges instead of a majority of the active eligible judges. 226
To grant rehearing, both section 46(c) of the Judicial Code and
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require an affirm222. Wald, Calendar, Collegiality, supra note 64, 'at 176.
223. Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 490.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 87-99.
225. Second Circuit Conference, supra note 73, at 161 (remarks of Judge James R.
Browning).
226. This suggestion has met with the approval of several circuit court judges. See, e.g.,
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 677 and S.678 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 162, 205 (1979) (statement of Judge Friendly); Newman, supra note 2, at 368 ("the base
for determining whether a majority of the active judges favors an in bane should be the number of
active judges eligible to participate in the case at hand."). See also Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh,
725 F.2d 910, 929 (3d Cir. 1983) (reh'g en bane denied) (Adams, J., statement sur petition for
rehearing) (musing that in light of the fact that affirmative votes by five of the available eight
circuit judges for en bane rehearing was insufficient to grant the petition because the circuit was
comprised of ten judges, "our Court's in bane voting rule must appear quite unfair."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1042 (2d Cir. 1972)
(reh'g in bane denied), a.ffd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (Timbers, dissenting from denial of rehearing)
("I think it is most unfortunate that en bane reconsideration of such a substantial question of
unusual importance is being denied despite" a majority of the eligible active circuit judges voting
in favor of rehearing); Blaher, supra note 63 (discussing Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh).

852

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:805

ative vote by a majority of the active circuit judges of the circuit who
are in regular active service. 227 Neither the enabling statute nor the
rule, however, sets forth which judges are in "regular active service."
In United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp., 228 the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to interpret what Congress meant
by "regular active service" and instead held narrowly that "under existing legislation a retired circuit judge is without power to participate
in an en bane Court of Appeals determination."229 Subsequently, Congress modified the "existing legislation" to allow a senior judge to participate "as a member of an in bane court reviewing a decision of a
panel of which such judge was a member." 230 Although this amendment to section 46(c) explained that senior judges are not included
among those judges who are in "regular active service," it has remained unclear exactly which judges are included within the meaning
of this term.
One commentator has interpreted the phrase "regular active service" to mean those judges who have been "appointed to the circuit
pursuant to section 44(a) of the Judicial Code who ha[ve] not retired
by the time of the en bane decision." 231 Such a definition, however,
begs the question of whether judges who are recused or otherwise unavailable-due to illness or personal circumstances-are considered to
be in "regular active service."
The ambiguity of the term "regular active service" in combination
with the Supreme Court's ruling "that Congress left it to the courts of
appeals to decide how they would exercise their discretionary power to
227. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) and FED. R. APP. P. 35, the full texts of which are set forth

supra note 51.
228. 363 u.s. 658 (1960).
229. !d. at 691.
230. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). The legislation was the result of a bill approved by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, which suggested adding the following sentence to Section 46(c):
"A circuit judge of the circuit who has retired from regular active service shall also be competent
to sit as a judge of the court in bane in the rehearing of a case or controversy if he sat in the court
or division at the original hearing thereof." ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 9-10 (1959) (quoted in United States v. AmericanForeign Steamship Corp., 363 U.S. at 690 n.7). This legislation was pending at the time of the
Court's adjudication of the American-Foreign Steamship case. !d. at 690. The effect of the legislation is well-settled: "Only the active judges of the circuit may participate in an en bane rehearing except that a retired judge of the circuit may also sit if he participated in the original panel
hearing." Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 738.
·
231. Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 738.
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sit en banc" 232 has led courts of appeals to promulgate inconsistent internal operating rules and procedures relating to their en bane powers.
For example, the internal operating rule of the Sixth Circuit that
requires an affirmative vote for rehearing by an "absolute majority"-i.e., a majority of all the active circuit judges who are eligible to
vote-provides that a "majority is determined by calculating the majority vote of all active judges on the court, not the number qualified to
hear the case." 233 Thus, under an "absolute majority" rule, judges who
are either recused or unavailable, count as votes against rehearing during en bane polls.234 By contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has adopted the opposite approach; its operating procedure provides that only "[a] simple majority of the voting active judges is required to grant a rehearing in banc."235 Under this "simple majority
rule," only an affirmative vote by a majority of those active judges present is required to grant review. 236 Additionally, some circuits have altogether avoided defining standards in their internal operating procedures and rules for how many and what type of judges are required to
vote in favor of rehearing in order to reach a majority of the judges in
232. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 269 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
233. See 6TH CIR. INTER. OPER. R. 20.7 (199Q).
234. See Copper & Brass Fabricators Council v. Department of Treasury, No. 81-2091
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 1982) (unpublished order denying rehearing in bane); Curtis-Wright Corp. v.
General Elec. Co., 599 F.2d 1259 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1022 (1980); Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), ajfd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973); 5TH CIR. R.
35.6 ("For purposes of en bane voting under 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), the term 'majority' is defined as a
majority of all judges of the court in regular active service presently appointed to office. Judges in
regular active service who are disqualified for any reason or who cannot participate in the decision
of an en bane case nevertheless shall be counted as judges in regular active service."). Some
circuits even construe a non-response as a vote against rehearing. See, e.g., 3o CIR. INTER. 0PER.
P. 9.5.4 (1992) ("An active judge who does not communicate with the opinionwriting judge concerning rehearing within eight (8) days after the date of the Clerk's letter transmitting the petition for rehearing is presumed not to desire in bane or than an answer be filed.").
235. 7TH CIR. 0PER. P. 5(d)(l) (1992).
236. See, e.g., 10TH CIR. R. 35.5 (1990) ("Hearing or rehearing en bane may be ordered by
a majority of the judges of this court who are in regular active service and not disqualified in the
particular case or controversy."); 4TH CIR. R. 35(b) (1990) ("A majority, but no fewer than four,
of all eligible, active and participating judges may grant a hearing or rehearing in bane."); but see
2o CIR. R. 35 (1990) ("Neither vacancies nor disqualified judges shall be counted in determining
the base on which 'a majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service' shall be
calculated, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), for purposes of ordering a hearing or rehearing in
bane.").
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regular active service,237 and have instead made this determination
through caselaw.238
Reducing the number of judges necessary to grant rehearing may
be accomplished by using the discretionary power granted to the courts
of appeals. In contrast to the circumstances faced by a three-judge
panel of the Ninth Circuit in Lang's Estate, 239 which had no formal
"method of hearing or rehearing by a larger number," 240 the Supreme
Court in Western Pacific Railroad Corp., authorized each circuit to
"devise its own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby
a majority may order such a hearing." 241 In bestowing this power upon
the courts of appeals, 242 the Court made clear its intention to allow
future cir'cuit majorities to amend their internal operating procedures
and rules to serve their own needs by stating that courts "should adopt
a practice whereby the majority of the full bench may determine
whether there will be hearings or rehearings en bane . . . so that a
majority always retains the power to revise the procedure." 2 " 3 The
Court also directed the circuits to "adopt such means as will enable its
full membership to determine whether the court's administration of the
power is achieving the full purpose of the statute so that the court will
better be able to change its en bane procedure, should it deem change
advisable." 244 Thus, the individual circuits may promulgate rules and
internal operating procedures that would allow modification in the way
en bane votes are tallied.
A second method to increase the use of en bane rehearings is to
amend section 46(c) and the federal procedural rule to allow en bane
rehearings even when they are desired by less than a majority of the
judges in regular active service. The exact number required for grant237. See, e.g., 8TH CIR. INTER. OPER. P. IV D (1990) ("a rehearing en bane is granted if a
- majority of judges in regular active service vote affirmatively.").
238. Compare 3D CIR. INTER. OPER. R. 9.5.3 (1992) ("Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), only
active judges of this court may vote for rehearing in bane. Therefore, rehearing in bane shall be
ordered only upon the affirmative votes of a majority of the judges of this court in regular active
service.") with Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1983) (en bane), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 266 (1984) (denying en bane consideration despite affirmative votes by five of the
available eight circuit judges when the circuit was comprised of ten judges).
239. 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938).
240. !d. at 869.
241. 417 u.s. 622, 625 {1974).
242. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to pre.scribe general rules of practice and procedure [for the] courts of appeals." !d.
243. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 261 (1953) (emphasis added).
244. !d. (emphasis added).
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ing rehearing would vary according to the determination by an individual circuit as to "whether the court's administration of the power is
achieving the full purpose of the statute." 2411 Although this second suggested method for improving en bane review is more radical than simply modifying the way courts interpret how many judges are required
to grant en bane rehearing, and may more drastically reduce the number of judges required, the decision to vote en bane will still remain one
of "the most serious non-merits determinations an appellate court can
make" 246 and will continue to receive thoughtful consideration. In addition, it must be remembered that a decision to rehear a case notes only
its significance to a circuit and is not a final determination of its merits.
Regardless of which suggestion for increasing the use of en bane
rehearings is adopted, it is imperative that the number of judges necessary to grant rehearing be reduced. Continuing vacancies on the courts
of appeals 247 have severely affected the mechanics of granting en bane
review. As discussed above, most courts require an affirmative vote by a
majority of a circuit's eligible judges in regular active service in order
to authorize en bane rehearings. 248 In other words, more than one-half
of a court's members must normally vote in favor of sitting en bane.
Continuing vacancies have, however, effectively required courts of appeals to obtain a supermajority of affirmative votes to grant en bane
review. Although a comprehensive table is set forth, two examples help
illustrate this point. In the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
which is authorized to have twelve members, seven active circuit judges
must affirmatively vote in favor of rehearing a case in order for that
case to be reviewed en banc.249 Because of unfilled judgeships, the Eleventh Circuit presently has only nine sitting active judges. 2110 Thus, instead of seven of twelve judges, or 58% of the court's affirmative vote,
seven of nine, or 78% are required. 2111 Along even more dramatic lines,
245.

Id.

246. Bartlett ex rei. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane)
(Edwards, J., concurring in denial of rehearings en bane).
247. See Table VII, infra.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 227-38.
249. See Table VII, supra.
250. See id.
251. See id.

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

856

[Vol. 54:805

TABLE VII
Number and Percentage of Judges
Required to Grant En Bane Rehearings
Number of
Judges
Number of Required
Authorized to Achieve
Judges
Majority

Circuit

Percentage

Number of
Judges
Number of Required
Actual
to Achieve
Judges
Majority

Percentage

D.C.

I2

7/I2

58%

II

7/11

64%

First

6

4/6

66%

4

4/4

100%

Second

13

7/I3

54%

12

7/12

58%

Third

I4

8/I4

57%

11

8/11

73%

Fourth

15

8/I5

53%

13

8/I3

62%

Fifth

I7

9/I7

53%

13

9/I3

69%

Sixth

16

9/I6

56%

14

9/I4

64%

Seventh

11

6/11

55%

10

6/10

60%

Eighth

I1

6/11

55%

IO

6/10

60%

Ninth

28

I5/28

54%

28

I5/28

54%

Tenth

I2

7/I2

58%

11

7/11

64%

Eleventh

I2

7/I2

58%

9

7/9

78%

the First Circuit, which is authorized to have six active judges in regular service, ~ 2 normally requires four of the six, or 66 % of its members
to be disposed toward rehearing. ~ 3 Because of two vacancies that leave
the circuit with only four judges, conceivably every judge must vote in
favor of en bane review for rehearing to be granted. ~ Moreover, the
overall percentage of circuit judges required to vote en bane has
2

2

2 4

252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id. Even more peculiarly, assuming that there was some method by which the First
Circuit could presently review a case en bane without senior circuit judge inclusion, and the two
judges who made up the majority on the original three-judge panel did not change their
votes-then the best result would be an even split and the decision of the district court would be
affirmed. For a more detailed account of the effects of a split en bane court, see discussion set
forth supra note I69.
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swelled from 56% to 67%.21111 These increases make it imperative that
the number of judges required to grant en bane review be reduced.
The critics of en bane review have themselves made three proposals to improve the en bane procedure, each of which would reduce the
number of rehearings granted. These proposals are self-disciplined adherence to circuit precedent,2118 circulation of opinions among all the
judges of a circuit prior to publication,2117 and requiring a supermajority
of active circuit judges to grant en bane review. 2118 The perceived benefits of these proposals to limit, and hence improve, en bane review, are
more illusory than real.
Advocates of judicial self-discipline explain that direct conflicts in
caselaw seldom arise when judges strictly follow the law of their circuits.2119 As can be expected, most courts of appeals already require
their members to adhere to circuit precedent. 280 There is therefore no
255. See Table VII supra.
256. See, e.g., Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 743 ("One alternative [to en bane
consideration] is to attempt to eliminate intra-circuit conflict by absolute adherence to circuit
precedent"); Note, supra note 2, at 1655 ("[T]he success of any efforts to limit the use of the en
bane procedure must rely on the reasoned self-restraint of the circuit judges.").
257. Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 727. See also Newman, supra note 2, at 381
("Some circuits routinely circulate all proposed panel opinions to the full court, thereby affording
each active judge an opportunity to request an in bane poll before the panel opinion is issued.").
Provision for the circulation of suggestions to panel members was made in a 1979 amendment to
Rule 35. See FED. R. APP. P. 35, NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES ("Provision is made for circulating the suggestions to members of the panel despite the fact that senior
judges on the panel would not be entitled to vote on whether a suggestion will be granted.").
Judge Newman has pointed out that when opinions are circulated, there often transpires an "in
bane polling" in which judges will send each other memoranda on the merits (or lack thereof) for
en bancing a case. Newman, supra note 2, at 379-80.
258. See, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at 1655 (it may be useful to require a larger degree of
consensus among circuit judges before en bane review will be ordered . . . . Congress could require an affirmative vote of two thirds."); Note, supra note 100, at 866 ("[R]equiring a
supermajority of the judges sitting in a circuit to vote to rehear a case offers the most promising
alternative to the current practice."). See also Carrington, supra note 91, at 585-96 (advocating
supernumerary judges who would not sit en bane). Not all judges agree. See, e.g., Newman, supra
note 2, at 368 ("[T]he base for determining whether a majority of the active judges favors an in
bane should be the number of active judges eligible to participate in the case at hand.").
259. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 2, at 382 ("[T]he need to 'secure or maintain uniformity of . . . decisions' will rarely arise if a court disciplines itself to follow its precedents faithfully.") (footnote omitted). See also Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S.
247, 270 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[T]he most constructive way of resolving conflicts
is to avoid them"); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 143, at 83 ("If each judge on a court acts
consistently from case to case, so too will the court that they constitute.").
260. See, e.g., 3D CIR. INTER. OPER. P. 9.1 (1992) ("It is the traditional of this court that
the holding of a panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent
panel overrules the holding in a published opinion of a previous panel. Court in bane consideration
is required to do so."). See also Bartlett ex rei. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (D.C.
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reason to believe that judges who presently ignore or evade this requirement would now yield to it because the incentives for following circuit
precedent would not chang~. In addition, strict adherence to circuit
precedent may, as has been demonstrated above, 261 prove detrimental
to circuit law in situations where the adhered-to precedent reflects a
minority of a court's view of the law.
Similarly, if a conflict is about to arise between existing circuit law
and a panel's proposed decision in a case, it is asserted by the critics
that this conflict can often be eliminated or at least minimized through
the dissemination and discussion of the pending opinion because this "is
clearly the most effective intramural method of discovering possible en
bane indications before panel decision is announced." 262 Judge Wald
reports that under these circumstance a mini en bane device known as
the "Irons Footnote," after Irons v. Diamond, 263 has become popular in
the D.C. Circuit:
Because only a full en bane court can overrule a panel opinion and because some
obsolete or unpopular precedents are just not important enough to elevate to full
scale briefing and en bane argument treatment, a panel may draft an opinion
overruling a prior precedent and circulate it to the full court, highlighting what it
is doing. If the court agrees, it will then be noted in the opinion that the former
precedent is no longer valid. 2 s.

Again, there is no reason to believe that judges who had previously
persisted in contra-majority holdings will now relent in their beliefs
simply because they are required to review a circulated opinion first.
Moreover, judges may be reluctant to persuade their colleagues to
amend their decisions because of "a combination of the notion that the
Cir. 1987) (en bane) (Edwards, J., concurring in denial of rehearings en bane) (Circuit court
judges "are both intelligent enough to know the law and conscientious enough to abide by their
oath to uphold it.").
261. See supra text accompanying notes 87-99.
262. Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 727. See also Friendly, supra note 78, at 676
("Consideration of an en bane at this stage is less traumatic than later when the full court is being
asked to alter a published opinion of a panel, and probably less time consuming as well."); Newman, supra note 2, at 380 ("A noteworthy aspect of the unsuccessful in bane polls is that on
occasion the request for a poll and the indication of some support for an in bane rehearing has
been followed by modification of the panel opinion.").
263. 670 F.2d 265, 268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
264. Wald, Changing Course, supra note 80, at 486 n.30 (citing Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 75 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 496 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Hobson v. Wilson, 737
F.2d 1, 16 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied; 105 S. Ct. 1843 (1985); Landrigan v. F.B.I., 722
F.2d 840, 845 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
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panel is the 'court' and an unwillingness to meddle in other judges'
opinions unless invited,"265 or because some jurists hold to the perception that "consistent attention to decisions of other panels takes a great
deal of time from a busy judge's own panel duties." 266
Finally, the critics argue that requiring a supermajority of judges
to vote in favor of rehearing ensures that only cases that truly warrant
en bane scrutiny will be passed upon by the full court.267 As stated
above, however, due to vacancies on the circuits, which now effectively
require affirmative voting by a supermajority of a court's members, this
proposal would make it nearly impossible for courts to grant en bane
review. As one commentator has stated:
[A] policy by which two judges are empowered to commit a [larger] court to a
decision which is contrary to the views of the other [appellate] judges and then
to prevent that dissenting majority from ordering a determination of the case en
bane, violates both the spirit and the letter of the statute and frustrates the salutary purpose of the en bane procedure.288

Two uncommon proposals also bear noting. Justice Walter Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court has suggested that "every circuit follow the first panel decision anywhere in the country, unless an en bane
decides to the contrary, in which event that en bane will control until
the Supreme Court holds otherwise."269 Professor Leo Levin has correctly pointed out that this proposal would "put an intolerable burden
on the U.S. Supreme Court, because you run the risk of achieving uniformity at the price of a less than optimal result, unless and until the
Supreme Court decides to intervene." 270 A second proposal is to increase the use of "mini" en bane reviews. Under this scheme, a panel
will circulate a proposed, yet unpublished decision that it believes will
conflict with circuit precedent prior to publication. 271 Once more it
265. See, e.g., Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 728. But see LLEWELLYN, supra note
71, at 317 (the reluctance to meddle in other judges' opinions is a "regrettable" condition in a
court which sits in divisions.).
266. Alexander, Part II, supra note 91, at 728.
267. See, e.g., Note, supra note 100, at 866 ("[R]equiring a supermajority of the judges
sitting in a circuit to vote to rehear a case offers the most promising alternative to the current
practice."). See also Carrington, supra note 91, at 585-96 (advocating supernumerary judges who
would not sit en bane).
268. Fay, supra note 9, at 491.
269. Levin, supra note 152, at 139.
270. Id.
271. See generally Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 74, at 544-64.

860

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:805

seems unlikely that judges convinced enough of their position to go
against established precedent would later amend their views. 272
Thus, the proposals offered by the critics of en bane review to reduce the use of en bane rehearings, if adopted, would not improve the
procedure, because the same judges who have previously failed to follow circuit rules are now bound by more rules.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has advocated increasing the use of en bane review in
order to achieve greater uniformity of circuit law. In so doing, it has
demonstrated how the intra-circuit uniformity achieved through en
bane rehearings justifies an increased use of en bane review by helping
to avoid minority control of circuit law and by reducing the flow of
cases to the Supreme Court. In responding to the critics of the procedure, this article has shown that the underlying institutional costs that
commentators impute to en bane review are greatly overstated. For although en bane rehearings do not dispose of cases as quickly as threejudge panel decisions, their infrequent use mitigates against its increased inefficiency. In addition, en bane rehearings have not been
demonstrated to erode finality of decisions, abrade the harmony of circuits or arise as the result of decision-oriented politics. Finally, this article has shown that continuing court of appeals vacancies, which create the need for a supermajority vote for en bane consideration, make
increased use of en bane rehearings a practical necessity because otherwise, decisions that do not reflect the views of a majority of a circuit's
judges will stand as precedent, and perhaps create intra-circuit conflicts
that can only be resolved by serendipitous Supreme Court review. It
has suggested that the use of en bane review can best be increased by
reducing the number of judges necessary to grant rehearing from a majority of eligible circuit judges to a majority of those available.
272. But see id. at 544-64. Accord Alexander, Part I, supra note 9, at 601, offering the
alternative of panel rehearing ("When a panel decision requires rehearing, it often may be done
more appropriately by the panel than by the court en bane.").

